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As new democracies such as the Republic of Estonia decide how to structure their 
military forces for the future, they will need to determine the mix of two different force 
components: standing-active duty forces, and reserve forces composed of citizen-soldiers. 
This thesis argues that reliance on reserves can offer significant advantages over standing 
forces, depending on a nation's external security requirements and domestic economic 
constraints. In particular, citizen-soldier reserves can allow nations that do not face 
immediate external threats, such as Estonia, to meet their security requirements for less 
money than required by standing forces. Citizen-soldier reserves are also less likely to 
pose a domestic threat to democratic civilian control. Both issues are of special concern 
to nations such as Estonia, where the process of democratic consolidation is still 
underway, and little funding is available for defense. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
As new democracies such as the Republic of Estonia decide how to structure their 
military forces for the future, they will need to detennine the mix of two different force 
components: standing active-duty forces, and reserve forces composed of citizen":soldiers. 
This thesis argues that reliance on reserves can offer significant advantages over reliance 
on standing forces, depending on a nation's external security requirements and domestic 
economic constraints. In particular, citizen-soldier reserves can allow nations that do not 
face immediate external threats, such as Estonia, to meet their security requirements for 
less money than required by standing forces. Citizen-soldier reserves are also less likely 
to pose a domestic threat to democratic civilian control. Both issues are of special 
. concern to nations such as Estonia, where the process of democratic consolidation is still 
underway, and little funding is available for defense. 
Force-structure options for nations such as Estonia comprise two basic choices: 
1) active forces made up of professional soldiers, and 2) reserve forces made up of 
citizen-soldiers who maintain civilian professions, and in tim~ of national or local need, 
step forward for military service. The National Defense League (NDL) or the Kaitseliit 
within the Republic of Estonia is a classic example of a citizen-soldier reserve force. 
Using Estonia as a case study, I will examine how a nation can best evaluate the 
advantages and disadvantages of relying on a citizen-soldier military structure. The 
essential policy question addressed in this thesis is what factors should detennine the role 
of citizen-soldier reserves in a nation's overall force structure. 
ix 
I found that four criteria are most useful for determining the proper role of citizen-
soldier reserves: the severity of the threat environment; economic constraints; the degree 
of democratic consolidation within a nation; and the relationship of society to the 
government. Estonia offers a classic example of a nation that could benefit from a heavy 
reliance on citizen-soldier reserves. For such reserves to be effective, however Estonia 
will have to make significant improvements in the organization, equipment, and training 
of the Kaitseliit. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
As new democracies such as the Republic of Estonia decide how to structure their 
military forces for the future, they will need to determine the mix of two different force 
components: standing active-duty forces, and reserve forces composed of citizen-soldiers. 
This thesis argues that reliance on reserves can offer significant advantages over reliance 
on standing forces, depending on a nation's external security requirements and domestic 
economic constraints. In particular, citizen-soldier reserves can allow nations such as 
Estonia (which do not face an immediate external threat) to meet their security 
requirements for less money than would be required by standing forces. Citizen-soldier 
reserves are also less likely to pose a domestic threat to democratic civilian control. Both 
issues are of special concern to nations such as Estonia, where the process of democratic 
consol~dation is still underway, and little funding is available for defense. 
Force structure options for nations such as Estonia involve two basic choices: 1) 
active forces made up of professional soldiers, and 2) reserve forces made up of citizen-
soldiers who maintain civilian professions, and in time of national or local need, step 
forward for militarY service. The National Defense League (NDL) or the Kaitseliit 
within the Republic of Estonia is a classic example of a citizen-soldier reserve force. 
Using Estonia as a case study, I will examine how a nation can best evaluate the 
advantages and disadvantages of relying on a citizen-soldier military structure. The 
essential policy question addressed in this thesis is what factors should determine the role 
of citizen-soldier reserves in a nation's overall force structure. 
I found that four criteria are most useful for determining the proper role of citizen-
soldier reserves: the severity of the threat environment; economic constraints; the degree 
of democratic consolidation within a nation; and the relationship of society to the 
government. Estonia offers a classic example of a nation that could benefit from a heavy 
reliance on citizen-soldier reserves. For such reserve to be effective, however, Estonia 
will have to make· significant improvements in the organization, equipment, and training 
of the NDL. 
Estonia provides an appropriate point of departure for two reasons. First, the 
future of Estonian security is important to peace in Europe. The Baltic countries lie in a 
strategically sensitive region. If Estonia is able both to devise an effective force structure 
and help preserve Baltic security, the stability of the region will be easier to preserve. 
Second, Estonia is an ideal case study for assessing the Tole of reserve forces. Estonia 
already has an established reserve force, the NDL. Estonian officials disagree over how 
much the nation should rely on this force rather than active-duty conscripts. By 
examining the criteria that nations should use to make such decisions, and applying those 
criteria to Estonia, this thesis will offer broader insights concerning the role of citizen-
soldier reserves in the post-Cold War era. 
A. STRUCTURE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE THESIS 
Although citizen-soldier forces have existed for thousands of years, confusion still 
persists about their defining characteristics. Chapter II will first review historical 
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examples of the implementation of the citizen-soldier option and how successful it has 
been in the past. This review will highlight the essential elements that differentiate the 
citizen-soldier concept from standing active-duty forces. This chapter will also examine 
the criteria that a state might use to determine the role of citizen-soldiers reserves in their 
overall force structure. In theory, a great variety of criteria could be employed. My 
analysis identifies which criteria are most significant, and describes how variations in 
these criteria should drive defense decision-making towards a reserve/active-duty mix. 
Chapter ill takes this analytical framework and applies it to the case of Estonia. 
In particular, I evaluate 1) the severity of the external threat to Estonia, 2) the economic 
constraints on Estonian Defense budgeting, 3) the degree of democratic consolidation 
within Estonia, and 4) the relationship of the Estonian people to the government. 
In Chapter IV, I will make policy recommendations based on the ·analysis in 
Chapter ill. I conclude that Estonia should rely heavily on citizen-soldiers reserves and 
maintain only very limited active-duty forces. I also conclude that Estonia possesses the 
necessary social and political prerequisites for a successful citizen-soldiery. Estonia has 
an educated and active populace, and a robust set of state institutions to provide the 
foundation for a successful reserve component. However, there is a great deal of work to 
be done before the current organization of the NDL can be transformed into a viable part 
of the Estonian defense establishment. I identify the shortfalls that exist and examine 
how they might be rectified. 
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B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
As a newly liberated nation, Estonia is currently working through its transition to 
democracy, while attempting to build a defense strategy that incorporates a reserve 
structure with historical roots. Revived from the former Estonian Republic, the NDL has 
made significant gains towards providing an effective citizen-soldier base for 
incorporation into the reserve military structure. In the future, a number of factors 
suggest that Estonia should increase its reliance on this reserve force. Estonia faces no 
immediate threat of invasion. If such a threat were to exist, a large standing military 
would be appropriate. Given the absence of such a threat, and the need for "insurance" 
against an uncertain future, a well-led and adequately equipped NDL should be able to 
meet the bulk ofEstoiiia's external security requirements .. 
Estonia also faces significant economic constraints as it moves from a command 
to a market economy. Therefore, the resources to build and maintain a standing military 
are not available at this time. 
In terms of the consolidation of democracy in Estonia, the nation has made terrific 
progress. A good constitutional structure for civilian control of the military is clearly in 
place. Standing militaries can often pose dangers to civilian control where democratic 
consolidation is incomplete. Estonia is a new democracy. Under these circumstances, a 
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reserve force is mory consistent with the need to ensure that the Estonian military 
continues to pose no threat to democratic consolidation. 
Finally, Estonia also possesses the social base of a democratic society that can 
support the requirements of the citizen-soldier concept, and take advantage of its 
potential benefits. Social conditions and the encouragement of citizens to become 
involved with their political surroundings are critical for transitioning democracies. 
Citizen-soldier defense organizations can provide additional benefits by not only 
encouraging members of society to take an active role in the defense of their nation, but 
by contributing additional resources to local governments in time of need. This can 
bolster overall involvement at both the community and national levels. 
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II. PROFESSIONAL RESERVE-COMPONENTS VS. ACTIVE-
DUTY FORCE STRUCTURE 
A. EVOLUTION OF CITIZEN-SOLDIER VS. ACTIVE-DUTY 
PROFESSIONALS 
Now more then ever, an economic and realistic form of defense organization 
needs to be established for democratic nations, particularly those transitioning from 
totalitarian regimes. In the case of Estonia, which cannot afford a huge defense budget 
but has real security concerns, an effective and affordable defense structure must be 
established. It is therefore' my contention that the citizen-soldier concept can not only 
meet the needs of providing a economical defense structure, but can also provide support 
to republican values. As many nations including the United States wrestle with huge 
defense budgets in the post- Cold War era, few can sacrifice security for economics. A 
simple review of history can provide the incent~ve to use an old concept that~ w~en 
adapted to the modem world, can achieve the desired effect: the citizen-soldier. 
The citizen-soldier concept is one that goes back as far as the Greek city-state. By 
utilizing a historical perspective of the citizen-soldier concept, it is easy to see its 
advantages and limitations. This analysis will identify the fundamental elements of the 
concept and will then apply them to Estonia. 
The basic idea of the citizen-soldier is one that embraces the concept of the 
Republic and the means of its protection. A Republic is a form of government that 
derives its power from the governed. Through representative government, the will of the 
people is expressed through the electorate. Therefore, the citizen-soldier has been seen 
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" ... as the proper recourse for republican citizens seeking to defend their political 
liberties, their property, and ultimately their freedom. ,,1 
Not only did the responsibility of self-government fall to the people, but so also 
its defense. This duality promoted the premise that rights and responsibilities are 
inseparable. An illustration of this is the farmer who tills the land he owns, benefits by 
its harvest, oversees its interests through representative government (a republic), and is 
also obliged to protect it in times of danger. During pre-industrial times, the concept of 
the Republic was tied closely to agrarian societies so that ownership of land and property 
played a major role in determining who was involved in the democratic process. Thus, 
not everyone was entitled to vote and participate in the process of government, as the 
right of citizenship was most commonly reserved for males who owned property. Since 
then, the idea of citizenship has expanded to most individuals in society based on a 
broadened interpretation of citizenship. 
This early idea of the democratic process also embraced the theory that the 
individual's role in society was first as a citizen and then as a soldier. Early societies 
placed higher value on economic sustenance than on the profession of arms. Military 
service was viewed as a civic duty, and not a profession unto itself. Therefore, military 
service was by its nature a secondary priority for every citizen of the republic. 
1 Jerry Cooper, The Militia and the National Guard in America Since Colonial Times: A Research Guide 
Greenwood Press, 1993, 16. Quoted in Gary Hart The Minuteman, (New York: The Free Press, 1998) 77. 
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Additionally, this democratic form of government conceived the notion that a strong, 
centraliZed (federal) government was counterproductive to the basic tenets of the 
Republic. 
New-born states [were] the focal point of mobilization, [they displayed] a 
distrust of central authority and strong conscription, and a military 
informality resistant to strict discipline, [the] stark separation of officers, 
and men, and professionalism generally. 2 
Therefore, to avoid standing armies, the citizens of the republic were obliged to support 
the defense structure needed to maintain security from external threats. The first real 
example of this concept was clearly seen in ancient Greece: 
The ethic of the Greek citizen-soldier was based upon his willingness to 
make any sacrifice necessary to defend his land, family, community, and 
the common good.3 
In Athenian society, citizens between the ages o~ eighteen and forty-two were 
considered candidates for military service: 
Those citizens between the ages of eighteen and twenty took an oath and 
served as ephebes [plebes or recruits]. They were given military and civic 
training in their first year of service; during this first year they served as 
well on guard duty at the port of Athens. In their second year, they 
received the shield and spear of a hoplite (so called after the hoplon, the 
great shield born by these phalanx warriors) at state ~xpense. They then 
served on garrison duty on the Athenian frontiers. After this point, they 
joined the regular body of citizens.4 
.This linkage of military service with the concept of citizenship clearly illustrates 
the idea of the Republic and its citizens' responsibility for defending it. This provided the 
2 E. Wayne Carp, "Early American Military History: a Review of Recent Work," Virginia Magazine of 
History and Biography 94 (July 1986) 276.Quoted in Gary Hart, The Minuteman, (New York: The Free 
Press, 1998) 77. 
3 Gary Hart, The Minuteman, (New York: The Free Press, 1998) 83. 
4 Michael M. Sage, Warfare in Ancient Greece (Routledge, 1996) 35. Quoted in Gary Hart, The 
Minuteman, (New York: The Free Press, 1998) 80. 
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Athenians with a viable defense mechanism, which lasted up until the Peloponnesian 
War. During this war, the introduction of mercenaries into the Athenian system created a 
decline in, and the eventual elimination of the citizen-soldier concept. As this protracted 
war dragged on, the wealth of the Republic was utilized to enlist soldiers that were 
considered less honorable than the hoplites. As the professionally-minded soldiers 
slowly assumed the direction of the war, the idea of a protracted conflict, or total war, 
emerged. Therefore, the end of the Athenian citizen-soldiery ushered in the concept of a 
professional military, which changed the direction and scope of warfare and the idea that 
soldiering was secondary to citizenship. The same circumstance occurred in the Roman 
Republic when it transitioned from a citizen-based military to the professional Roman 
Legions: 
Rome's military was small, family-based, relatively unstratified. Early 
republican political and especially military leaders of the fifth and fourth 
centuries B.C. were characterized more by their resistance to public office 
than by their lust for it.s 
Great leaders like Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus were reluctant to serve in public 
office. When elected consul of Rome, he preferred to remain on his farm. This 
philosophy towards public service was one of serving only in time of national emergency. 
Cincinnatus illustrated the willingness to serve for the common good, yet at the same 
time demonstrated a stronger commitment to the individual than to the state. This 
concept of individualism is rooted in the understanding that the responsibility to guard 
personal rights is found in the collective good. Cincinnatus' uriderstanding of these 
5 Gary Hart, The Minuteman, (New York: The Free Press, 1998) 84. 
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principles led fellow citizens to elect him because of his values, not because he desired 
the position. The citizen-soldier concept along with the republic were eventually lost to 
the imperialistic Empire and the centralized power of Caesar. Much like Athens before 
it, Rome moved towards an army of conquest for the sake of imperialistic motives. 
A great scholar of republics, Niccolo Machiavelli underscored the need for the 
citizen-soldier in his work, Art of War (Arte della Guerra). Machiavelli viewed the 
intertwining of the citizen and his responsibility to the defense of the republic· as the 
essence of civic virtue. He advocated the following: 
[a] well-ordered republic combining the fierceness of the lion to frighten 
away the wolves with the shrewdness of the fox in avoiding the snares, " 
and citizens who place the common good at least equal to if not before 
self-interest. 6 
Machiavelli's grasp of the concept went even further as he compared the citizen-
soldier to the mercenaries: 
A citizen called to arms, with a home and an occupation of his own, will 
wish to end the war and go home, where a mercenary, glad rather than 
sorry if the war drags on indefinitely, will make no attempt to win it.? 
This statement makes evident Machiavelli's loathing of mercenaries, and specifies 
the core value of the citizen-soldier concept. When this core value is translated even 
further, it indicates that a militia is defensive rather then aggressive. 
Machiavelli's understanding of this was clearly seen in his dissertation to the 
princes of his time. In the "The Prince"" he provides a haunting warning: "the arms of 
another man [mercenary] either. slide off your back, weigh you down, or tie you Up.,,8 He 
6 Ibid., 88. 
7 Ibid., 89. 
8 Ibid., 90. 
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clearly saw that the respective declines of the Greek and Roman empires were connected 
to a lack of duty and responsibility on the part of civilians to the republic. Machiavelli 
clearly understood the value of the citizen-soldier, not only for defense, but also for 
society. This understanding created new thinking in the field of military force structure. 
The next time in history we see the rise of the citizen-soldier to any significant 
degree is during the formation of the English militia in the Eighteenth Century. This was 
the New Model Army, which was formed for a variety of reasons, both practical and 
political. The fact that the citizenry held a large number of arms, and the townships 
possessed large quantities of munitions (enough to sustain a siege) required a new 
concept of military structure, different from that of the old feudal system: 
In 1655, Cromwell revived the militia to combat the widespread 
conspiracy of that year, and it was militia of a sort, not ordinary troops, 
that were ;,laced at the disposal of that epitome of military rule, the Major 
Generals. 
As a result, the militia system was not truly a form of defense of the republic, but 
rather was formed during this time to protect the government from the people. This was 
an interesting lise of the militia, but not in accordance with the citizen-soldier concept. 
Cromwell understood the great power that is contained within a citizen-soldier force. A 
key point of Cromwell's concept deals with the effectiveness of the militia as a military 
organization. The citizen militia was an effective force to provide for the internal 
security of the nation, but not effective when used to project force outside of the nation. 
9 J.R. Western, The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century (Toronto, Univ. of Toronto Press, 1965) 7. 
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The militia was used to provide internal security, to maintain the public order, and 
to "secure the permanence of the Restoration by the frustration of plots and the repression 
of disloyalty." 10 This intriguing political application becomes more prevalent later whep 
different governmental institutions debated who controlled the militia. From 1660 to the 
1670s, the King and the Parliament debated over who controlled the militia. These 
debates frequently ended in a deadlock. This English example clearly identifies the 
power of the common man in relation to the power of military force. 
The militia was needed both to provide for the security of the government and to 
insure domestic survivability of the Restoration. The political strife between the 
executive and legislative branches of government was more pronounced later, 
particularly within the United States system. 
The most contemporary experience of the militia concept is seen within the 
American colonial system. The British example was used by this fledgling young colony 
not only to provide for its protection from other European powers, but also to provide a 
force to contend with the North American wilderness. The idea that members of the 
community were required to serve in order to protect their property and families was a 
realistic manner of defense for the young colonies: 
The militia heritage, together with the sense of military insecurity and the 
inability of the economically poor colonies to maintain an expensive 
professional army, all combined to guarantee that the Elizabethan militia 
would be transplanted to the North American Colonies. l1 
10 Ibid., 30. 
11 Gary Hart, The Minuteman, (New York: The Free Press, 1998) 95-96. 
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Ironically, this system was successful in expelling the English during the 
American Revolution. With thirteen autonomous colonies, there were thirteen different 
militias who operated independently from each other. However, the common bond was 
that the colonial militia system was a requirement for all male members of the colony. 
There were age considerations, but they had little impact on the availability of all men 
within the colonies. Militiamen were expected to own and maintain their weapons and 
munitions so that, when called upon, the individual was ready and able to participate in 
military operations. This was not unusual, since the maintenance of arms and supplies 
was part of the day-ta-day life of a colonist in the wilderness. 
Periodic musters (formations, or gatherings of troops) were conducted· to 
determine available strength, status of equipment, and readiness of these militiamen. 
Not standardized throughout the colonies, these thirteen individual armies were led 
mainly by political forces within the colonies themselves. Therefore, standardization 
within the militias was as diverse as the political landscape within the colonies. 
The most notable factor in the emergence of the American militia system and the 
American military infrastructure was that two distin~t armies developed during the 
Revolutionary War. As this new nation was coming to grips with a revolution against the 
British realm, it also had to develop its own military. What occurred is quite remarkable 
and should be considered a model for today's developing nations. 
George Washington formed the Continental Army, which was augmented with 
colonial militias during the conflict. This concept of two armies capitalized on the need 
for a small centralized force to combat the aggressor (British), and supplemented it with a 
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larger decentralized citizen-soldier force to provide the combat power to win the day. By 
combining these two types of armies, George Washington proved that the strength of a 
military defense structure was found in the advantages and disadvantages of both 
systems. The organization and discipline of the Continental Army and integration of the 
sheer numbers and combat-power resource of the colonial militias set the stage for a 
comprehensive defense structure. 
Although the Continental Anny and the colonial militia structures would fmd 
themselves at odds with each other, . this inherent conflict provided the checks and 
balances needed to protect the republic from internal destruction by military coups. At 
the conclusion of the Revolutionary War, the founding fathers were confronted with the 
question: " ... shall we have a standing army or citizen militia and, if a standing army, 
what is its mission?,i12 
. This issue was . the center of great controversy, as it will always be within a 
republic. One notable legal scholar, William Blackstone, stated: 
In free states ... no man should take up arms but with a view to defend his 
country and its laws; he puts not off the citizen when he enters the camp; 
but it is because he is a citizen, and would wish to continue so, that he 
makes for a ~hile a soldier.13 
The debate on the standing army and the militia continues today. Throughout the 
history of the United States the two armies remained: one to guard the republic, the other 
to guard the nation. They worked hand-in-hand and at odds with each other. The key to 
the United States' stability and success has been the balancing of advantages and 
12 Ibid., 97. 
13 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1783) Quoted In Gary Hart, The 
Minuteman, (New York: The Free Press, 1998) 98. 
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disadvantages between the two armies. This has been uniquely the American model, 
which mayor may not be appropriate for other cultures or societies. 
A contemporary model of the citizen-soldier concept is Sweden's military reserve I 
system. This system is more closely related to the "man in arms" philosophy of most 
European nations and is a model to be considered by newly independent states. 
This historical review has identified several important points to consider when 
looking at militias and the citizen-soldier concept. These considerations can be utilized 
to comprehend the basic ideals of the republican form of government with relationship to 
its defense establishment. 
B. EXTERNAL SECURITY ROLE ISSUES 
All nations at one time or another face the question of security, because military 
power is quite often the key to national survival. State sovereignty has always rested 
securely on the shoulders of a military whose mission is to defend the nation from 
external aggression: "Military missions are d~termined in large part by the threat 
environment that a nation faces." 14 Therefore, the questions of how large the military 
force should be and how it should be designed are usually based on the threat to national 
interests. Consequently, economic factors, political input, and force structure must be 
considered. A nation must consider the sustainability of a large standing army (active 
force) or place its emphasis on a reserve-component. Additionally, a nation might even 
14 Larry Diamond and Marc F Plattner. "Civil-Military Relations and Democracy" (Baltimore, The John 
Hopkins Press, 1996) xiii. 
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consider a combination of both systems to capitalize on the benefits of each. These 
considerations are the fundamental issues with which a nation must deal when 
determining how its military forces will be designed. 
There are many positive and negative factors when considering the active force. 
The advantage of a standing army is that it can provide a nation with a professional force 
that is ready at a moment's notice. This capability provides the nation with a military 
force that can quickly react to threats and is demonstrate its willingness to maintain 
sovereignty. An additional advantage is that contained within a standing army is an 
officer corps, which is the professional body that directs the military. In fact, with 
respect to the composition of an active-officer corps, Samuel Huntington considers three 
variables that set the tone for the entire organization: "The distinguishing characteristics 
of a profession as a special type of vocation are expertise, responsibility, and 
corporateness. ,,15 The tone of the military organization is set by these characteristics as 
practiced by the officer corps. 
The expertise of active units is clearly evident since they must maintain their 
readiness to defend the nation. This readiness equates to practicing combat skills and 
tactical deployment on a regular schedule. When mastered and practiced, this expertise is 
critical in times of conflict, and produces forces that are capable of effective military 
operations. Time plays a key role in maintaining the expertise of an individual. The 
more one practices a particul,ar skill, the more proficient one becomes, no matter how 
15 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Soldier and the State", (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
1957) 8. 
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complicated the task. In large-scale military operations, the synchronization of the 
battlefield operating systems requires constant repetition to master these critical war-
fighting tasks. Active forces possess the lUxury of having the time to practice and hone 
their skills and operational arts. Active forces also maintain a high level of proficiency in 
their respective tasks because they practice their skills on a daily basis. This level of 
readiness cannot be matched by other components and is a clear advantage to having a 
standing force 
Samuel Huntington also speaks of responsibility. Officers are directors of 
violence (combat operations) and are held accountable for their actions. This means that 
military commanders must answer to their respective civilian leaders. Therefore, 
authority rests with the civilian leadership while the military masters the means of power 
or physical force. This .again se~s the tone for the organization and sets the standard to 
which most standing armies adhere. By effective legal systems within militaries, leaders 
are held to a high level of accountability. 
The element of corporateness, holds that the officer corps is a closed society of 
professionals who, through th~ir shared experiences and their demanding lifestyles band 
together to form a select group. This cohesiveness creates a profession capable of 
producing effective leaders. This corporate mentality provides a military with a strong 
and determined leadership capable of maintaining high standards of dedication to 
national security. 
Another consideration a standing army affords a national leader is the flexibility 
to use military force without being hampered by political requirements or mobilization 
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timetables. This allows quick and decisive action when needed to defend the nation. An 
active force is capable of the rapid response and force projection that national leaders 
need to react to international turmoiL 
When reviewing the disadvantages of a large standing army, we can easily 
conclude that an active force can be a liability for any country ·because of the expense 
involved to maintain it. Large sums of money are spent on soldiers' salaries, billeting, 
equipment, and provisions to sustain an active military. The maintenance of a large 
active force can place a huge strain on a nation's budget and will cause political leaders to 
question its worth when c~mpared to domestic requirements. The high expense to 
maintain an active force also brings with it political vulnerability. 
The corporate aspect identified by Samuel Huntington can also be considered a 
negative factor in relation to the active force.' A closed society can alienate itself from 
the society it protects, which in tum can cause distrust between the two. The separation 
. . 
between the military and the society it protects can cause critical problems in the host 
nation. 
With respect to a consolidated democracy like, the United States, this level of 
separation is constantly in transition, and is sometimes considered in crisis. Snider and 
Carlton-Carew note that the "relationship between general [military] and politician is 
often tense.,,16 A democracy must insure that this friction is contained at a level that does 
not threaten the government itself. 
16 Snider, Don M. and Carlton-Carew, Maranda A. U.S. Civil-Military Relations, (Washington D.C.: The 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995) vii. 
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The accessibility of a force can cause unscrupulous leaders to use the military in 
ways that are counterproductive to the society. An active force's quick reaction can 
easily usurp the more tedious process of political analysis. Therefore, the time needed to 
gain political acceptance for the use of military force could easily be expropriated. 
Moreover, the active military could be used improperly against the will of the nation. 
This is considered the most dangerous aspect of an active force. Civilian supervision is 
critical for the balance of power between the military and its civilian leadership. 
Another negative aspect of an active military institution is its resistance to 
change. The restrictive thinking of the leadership within the military make rapid 
institutional change difficult. Resistance to change sometimes is produced when the 
civilian leadership does not understand the military. At their worst, military institutions 
have overthrown civilian authority (coups). Restrictive military thinking can be 
counterproductive when political leaders make changes in policy and national direction 
that adversely impact the active force. This mindset on the part of military leaders can 
cause abrasive relationships between the civil authority and the military institutions. 
The same applies to the reserve-components. There are inh~rent advantages and 
disadvantages to this form of military structure. The most important advantage of a 
reserve-component is its cost-effectiveness. When a soldier is on duty for only a limited 
amount of time, costs are minimal. The advantage extends further into the service life of 
equipment and the minimum supplies needed to sustain a reserve-component as 
compared to a standing military. Usually the rule of thumb is that a nation can sustain 
four reserve-component soldiers for every one active-component soldier of equivalent 
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rank. This ratio gives a nation a four-to-one advantage in manpower for a reserve-
component versus an active component. This ratio also impacts the military 
infrastructure; a nation does not have to sustain a huge number of military installations. 
Reserve-components require a less extensive infrastructure, in some cases sharing 
buildings to save costs. 
The community factor of a reserve-component is that it provides a linkage to the 
society which the military ultimately serves. This linkage works both ways. The 
community supports their military more readily since its members are active participants. 
The corollary is that members of the military reserve see themselves as protectors of 
society and are less likely to act in ways counter to society's wishes. This relationship 
ties the military closely to the community. As a result, both organizations participate in 
the development of a population that involves itself in groups and social organizations· . 
(also known as social capital). 
Reserve forces are usually larger than active military forces since the cost factors 
are lower and citizens do not have to make an entire career change. Therefore almost 
anyone in society can become a member of the military and maintain his/her civilian 
profession or occupation. This provi~es the members of the reserve with the opportunity 
to maintain their livelihoods while maintaining their military affiliations. This has a 
residual effect on society in that members of the military are provided with training that 
they can use in their respective civilian endeavors. Leadership training provided by the 
military can be effectively used in the civilian arena. These benefits are not readily 
apparent, but can provide additional military support to the community. 
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A reserve force used in conjunction with an active force can extend the society's 
investment in the entire military structure. When a soldier leaves the active force and 
enters the civilian world, the military can continue to use the investment in the soldier's 
training and education if he enters the reserve forces. This extends the initial investment 
made in training and education and expands the range of the military's influence. The 
military can retain a trained soldier longer and maintain a broader military-trained base to 
draw on during mobilization. A soldier who is in the reserve can sustain a higher level of 
proficiency then an ordinary citizen and affords the military the opportunity to keep 
personnel with a higher level of readiness. 
A reserve-component also has disadvantages that should be considered when 
looking at force structure. The most significant factor is that a reserve-component 
maintains a lower ievel of proficiency than the active-duty, which is caused by ·the 
relativ~ lack of training time available to develop war-fighting skills. Most of these skills 
are perishable (e.g. land navigation, weapons firing, crew training, etc.) and are lost when 
not practiced on a routine basis. Although some of these skills can be used in the civilian 
arena (e.g., law enforcement, engineering, and leadership), there is little opportunity to 
maintain proficiency outside formal military training periods for the most part. 
Therefore, a part- time force can only maintain a limited level of readiness that must be 
supplemented with a period of training before commitment to combat operations. This 
presents a problem to a nation since the force will require time to mobilize and deploy 
effectively. This time could be critical in the event of an immediate threat to sovereignty 
such as an invasion: 
22 
One of the most significant aspects is that considerable premobilization 
planning and preparation must take place if any of the alternatives 
described [levels of proficiency] are to occur smoothly early in the 
postmobilization period. 17 
Reserve-components have a tendency to produce what is known as the "good old 
boy" system and evolve into social clubs. This tendency occurs when members of the 
community remain in a particular unit for extended periods of time. If the leadership 
does not recognize this situation and react accordingly, military professionalism is lost to 
the group dynamics. Therefore, when considering a reserve-component and allocating 
resources to it, professionalism must be monitored and maintained. 
This analysis of the differences between active and reserve forces reveals the 
fundamental differences between the two types of force structures. When weighing the 
advantages and disadvantages, a nation must take into account the threat and subsidiary 
factors of budget constraints, political realities, and social climate. When all factors ar~ 
taken into account, a nation can effectively build a force structure that meets its security 
needs while balancing all of the pressures placed upon it. 
C. POLITICAL ISSUES 
1. Republican Society 
Our world is made up of many societies and these societies are marked by unique 
cultures, values, and norms. Governments by their very nature conform themselves to the 
17 RAND Corp. "Postmobilization Training Resource Requirements" (RAND Corp. Publishing Arroyo 
Center 1996) xviii. 
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values and nOlms of the society they govern. This manifestation of social values within 
governments is both deliberate and unintentional. The best place to identify these social 
values is in the nation's constitution. This document conveys the rule of law for the 
society and "a legal culture with strong roots in civil society and respected by political . 
society and the state apparatus.,,18 A constitution provides "a hierarchy of norms that 
make actions by, and upon, other arenas legitimate and predictable.,,19 The end result is a 
constitution that expresses the values of the society it represents. This understanding of a 
democratic system of government provides the base for which the citizen-soldier concept 
can exist. Therefore, an understanding of the dynamics of the social base is critical for 
this study. 
As we have seen in recent history, societies making the transition from totalitarian 
regimes to democratic societies tend to adapt themselves to the culture they represent. . . 
Historically a society rooted in individual rights and the protection of property migrates 
to a democratic form of government. 
As we look at the dynamics of a democratic form of government, it is important to 
keep in mind that as a society moves from a totalitarian form of government to a 
democracy, the social base must also ~ake the transition. During the Soviet occupation 
of Estonia, individual rights were not afforded to the members of society. As a result, 
after independence, individual rights were an alien concept to the general populace and 
have taken time to become integrated with societal norms. Understanding the dynamics 
18 Linz, Juan J. and Stepan, Alfred. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. (Baltimore, 
The John Hopkins Press, 1996) 14. 
19 Ibid. 
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of a stable democracy also helps determine if the social environment will support a 
citizen-soldier concept for a nation's defense strategy. The same social conditions that 
provide the base for the democratic environment to operate effectively also provide thy 
conditions for the citizen-soldier system to operate properly. 
Therefore, it is important to understand these two fundamental dimensions: 1) the 
republican principle, and 2) the variables needed for the existence of a stable democratic 
system. These aspects reinforce each other and provide the social dynamics for this type 
of government system. 
In Webster's, the word republic is defined: 
a state or nation in which the supreme power rests in all the citizens 
entitled to vote (the electorate) and is exercised by representatives elected, 
directly or indirectly, by them and responsible to them.20 
The republican form of government is a form of representation of the people by 
elected officials. Thus, it is imperative that citizens of a republic be involved in politics 
for the process of government to work effectively and efficiently. As a result, forms of 
social capital are critical for the existence of a republican form of government. Citizen 
involvement in clubs, social organizations, political groups, and non-governmental 
organizations reflects a society that supports social interaction. This support in tum 
encourages citizens to take an active role in issues that influence them. 
This creates a society that sustains the republican form of government. The net result is 
informed and committed citizens who take an active role in the government which 
represents them. This is supported by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan's argument: 
20 Webster's New World Dictionary, 3rd College ed .. 
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[whereas] .. .interests and values of civil society are the major generators of 
political society, civil society generates ideas and helps monitor the state 
apparatus and economic society.21 
Historically, cultures that are educated transition to republican or democratic 
forms of government. The populace understands the dynamics of political impact, and by 
remaining involved, expresses its views through votes. This means a high value is placed 
on an educated populace that intellectually constructs the laws and institutional 
framework of government based on its morals and social values. This element is 
critical to the framework of the republican form of government, and is found at the grass-
root level of society: This means that not only an educated elite, but also the general 
population should maintain a high level of literacy. I contend that the existence -of 
widespread public and private secondary schools and universities shows a society that 
values learning and encourages creative thinking. A higbly educated society is conducive 
to advanced forms of government and can clearly articulate the need for defense. 
Consequently, understanding the concepts of security, national unity, and protection of 
property establishes the base of an involved population. 
Within a democratic society, economic soundn~ss plays a critical role in the 
survival of the republic. Economic stability in transitioning nations is at best difficult 
when moving from a command economy to a market economy. The realization of 
private property and the sufficiency of material needs, are signs of continual economic 
growth. To many in the academic environment this element is critical to democratic 
21 Juan J Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems Of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. (Baltimore, The 
John Hopkins Press, 1996) 14. 
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government. This is best exemplified by the economic society that "produces the 
indispensable surplus to allow the state to carry out its collective good functions and 
provides a material base for the pluralism and autonomy of civil and political societies.,,22 
Economic stability and liveliness of a democratic system are critical for the 
survival of the nation and, when viewed from the institutional level, can be expressed 
through the gross national product. The level of disposable income at the grass-roots 
level of society is where this economic well being is best illustrated. 
It is therefore imperative to uriderstand how a society relates to its military. In 
many respects, the citizens of a republican society are suspicious of standing armies. 
Consequently, it is benefiCial for a military to be closer to the grass roots of society, 
rather than alienated and detached. This inherent feeling of suspicion towards the 
military is reflected" in the political jn~titutions. Table" 1 provides the key elements of 
social base. 
SOCIAL BASE TO SUPPORT THE CITIZEN-SOLDIER CONCEPT 
A stable Republican or Democratic System of Government (Legitimacy) 
Distribution of Social Capital 
Educated populous 
Participation 
Sense of Benefit (worth - ownership) 
Economic - Stability 
Table 1. Social Base Key Elements 
22 Ibid 14. 
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2. State Institutions 
Institutional support refers to the legislative and structural framework provided by 
the government in relation to the military. In this case, governmental institutions must b~ 
capable of providing direct support to the citizen-soldier. To identify these variables 
readily, it is critical to begin with the legislative components that legitimize the military 
and its respective reserve-component. In some cases, this may be spelled out in the 
constitution or specified through legislation directed towards the military as a whole. The 
critical variable is the existence of legislation that authorizes a military, establishes a 
chain of command during peacetime and conflict, and clearly specifies the role of the 
military within the framework of government. 
Within a democratic system, it is critical that the military be subordinate to a 
civilian government. Therefore, legislation should contain the guidelines that clearly set 
the legal stage for the civilian authority to direct the military. In most democratic nations 
this is found somewhere within the constitution, which provides the basic legitimacy for 
the presence of a military structure. The constitution can be detailed or just provide the 
general guidance needed to create precise laws and legislation to deal with the specific 
issues. Most often the constitution outlines the branch of government to which the 
military will be subordinate. The issues of funding and appropriations usually are 
contained within the concept of the military. The end result is a government document 
that authorizes the existence of the military and prescribes its organization, civilian 
leadership, and support mechanisms. If these elements are specified, the critical variable 
of military legitimacy is present. 
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For a reserve-component this legitimacy mayor may not be contained in the 
fabric of the constitution. If a reserve-component is to exist within the framework of the 
military structure, it is necessary for it to be legally created. In several cases, the source 
of the legal framework for legitimate military institutions has been the source of heated 
debate. Since republics, by their nature, fear standing armies, many nations include the 
fabric of a citizen-soldier organization within their legislation to prevent military coups. 
These fundamental views shape civil-military relationships within democratic 
governments. As a result, we frequently see two-army systems. Such systems provide 
checks and balances on power. Many democracies have adopted this system as a 
stabilizing factor. 
This creates a critical relationship between the civilian authority and the military. 
The most interesting aspect is that this relationship is an overlapping one. This creates a 
"systemic relation between the military and the civilian authority.,,23" The best way to 
illustrate this relationship is contained in Figure 1, created by Sam C. Sarkesian and 
quoted by Don M. Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew in their book "U.S. Civil-
Military Relations." This overlapping relationship within a democratic society can be 
achieved when the military is contained within the system of government, which in this 
case is ultimately the people themselves. This involvement by both the people and their 
institution of defense creates a balanced relationship. The overlapping aspects provide 
the civilian elites with authority over the military leadership and military society. This is 
based on the democratic principle that a military contained within a democratic socio-
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political system is subordinate to it. For the sake of survival, they must be intertwined. 
This mutually supportive relationship needs to be clearly understood by both the military 
and the civilian elites. 
Figure 1. Political Military Social System 
The concept of gradient involvement of civilian authority over military policy 
(which I shall call leverage) ushers in an understanding of civil-military relations and the 
need to establish supremacy of civilian authority over military institutions. There are 
many variables that should be evaluated to determine the level of involvement of the 
23 Don M. Snider and Maranda A. Carlton-Carew, U.S. Civil-Military Relations, (Washington D.C.; The 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995) 5. 
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civilians in military issues and assure their ultimate control. "At their strongest, these 
institutions allow civilian rulers to effectively supervise and direct military forces. ,,24 
A critical element for civilian control of the armed forces is civilian personnel 
who understand the inner workings of the military and who hold supervisory positions 
within the ministry of defense. The government, which controls the military through 
policy and appropriations, must have trained personnel who understand military issues. It 
controls the budget, sets military policy, creates a military legal system, and procures and 
directs the military to adhere to standards set by the civilian authority. Having trained 
civilian personnel insures leverage over the military and its administration, and is critical 
to the civil-military relationship. If controlled by military personnel in civilian clothes, it 
becomes a mere tool of the military. If civilian experts are present and the focus of the 
ministry is on the political priorities set by the ruling party, then a strong gradient of 
civilian control exists. This involvement will insure that the military stays within the 
boundaries of its mission and does not extend into governmental tasks (as has occurred in 
many democratic nations). 
This impact of civilian involvement· in the management of t1:).e military extends to 
the reserve-component through control over reserve forces and policy. This civilian 
defense apparatus sets military policy, and if a nation's policy is to have a reserve 
structure within the organization, civilian authority extends to this arena as well. The end 
24 Harold A. Trinkunas, "Crafting Civilian Control of the Armed Forces: Statecraft, Institutions, and 
Military Subordination in Emerging Democracies". Dissertation Manuscript, Department of Political 
Science, Stanford University, Forthcoming. 
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result is a comprehensive organization that is capable of managing the defense policy, 
structure, and appropriations of a given nation. 
The corollary to these variables is that the governmental framework provides the 
needed support for the military to perform its primary mission. As a result, the 
governmental institutions should be not only controlling the military but also providing 
for its existence and supplying the tools needed to perform its mission. In particular, 
governmental institutions should provide for the protection of the citizen-soldier who 
might perform military activities that conflict with civilian employment. When the 
soldier is paid by the government while performing military duties, laws should insure 
that the citizen-soldier is protected while serving for the national defense. In addition, the 
government should show its support through defense appropriations to provide the 
reserve-component with training finance and equipment. 
The best way to express this gradient relationship between the military and its 
civilian authority is illustrated in Figure 2, created by Howard A. Trinkunus. In this 
diagram, concentric circles display the relationship between the levels of involvement of 
the military within the organizations of government and indicate a clear division of labor. 
The more the military crosses the lines from the center, the further away it gets from its 
required duties, and therefore the greater potential there is for civil-military conflict. 
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Figure 2. Gradient Levels of Military Involvement in Government 
A final suggestion would be that the military should be contained within the 
sphere of its assigned duties to insure that it does not enter into the realm of government 
where it does not belong. The corollary is that civilian authority should give the military 
autonomy within its sphere of responsibility, which is the task of operations to maintain 
external security. There are times when lines can and must be crossed, but this should be 
done with caution. 
Table 2 provides the fundamental areas that need to be examined to determine the 
level of civilian involvement with military deciSion-making. This can be used as a tool to 
determine the gradient level of civil-military involvement within a particular case study. 
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Legality of Military Institutions - Constitutional legitimacy 
- Clearly defined civilian authority 
within legislation 
Gradient of Involvement of Civilian - Civilian-led defense ministries 
Authority over Military Policy - Construction of military policy 
(Leverage) - Civilian control of budget 
- Evidence of civilian leverage over 
military 
- Civilian supervision 
- Civilian defense experts 
- Jurisdictional boundaries between 
civilian and military tasks 
- Military accountability to civilian 
authority 
- Military Personnel Issues: force 
structure, education and career 
tracks(promotions/entitlements ) 
Table 2. :Key Elements of Civil-Military Involvement 
D. EFFECTIVE RESERVE-COMPONENT FUNCTIONAL 
REQUIREMENTS 
For a reserve-component to be considered viable to a defense strategy, a review of 
Samuel Huntington's aspects of professionalism is critical. Although these factors deal 
solely with standing professional armies, when supplemented with elements relevant to 
the uniqueness of a reserve-component, they can be used as a basis for reserve-
component analysis. The following elements should always be considered: 1) organizing 
the force, 2) equipping the force, 3) training the force, and 4) the leadership dimension 
:contained within the organization. With respect to the reserve-component, the following 
should also be considered: 5) the social base to support a citizen-soldier, and 6) 
institutional support for the citizen-soldier. These factors establish the dynamics of the 
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professional environment of a military organization within a reserve-component. The 
overall· construction of a reserve military organization determines its ability to function 
effectively. This is the difference between a disorganized, armed rabble and a 
comprehensive military organization capable of disciplined tactical maneuver. 
1. Organization 
The structure of a reserve-component should mirror comparable organizations 
within the national military infrastructure. The first element is the structure of command 
and control. Within the republic, this structure flows from the civilian authority directly 
to the military chain of command and is reflected through civilian policy, regulations, and 
legal statutes. Therefore, with respect to the formation of force structures, the 
organization of an infantry squad, therefore, should be the same in the reserve as it is in 
the active component. Regardless of the size and make-up ·of the structure, it is necessary 
to provide for continuity, which allows for interoperability. The structure should be 
operational in nature and capable of a war-fighting mission (e.g. a squad capable of 
performing squad level drills or tasks, or platoons capable of performing platoon-level 
tasks). The organizational structure must be clear and attaina~le. An authorized ten-man 
squad is not functional with three men. Hence, the following parameters should be 
present for the structure to be considered organizationally sound: 
- Command and control, beginning with the civilian authority (republic or 
democratic system) which flows to the military, then down to the lower 
organizations within the force structure; 
- A structure that is consistent with the other military organizations of that 
country's military force structure; 
- A structure that is capable of accomplishing an assigned war-fighting mission; 
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- A clearly defined organizational structure that provides everyone with a 
position, and related duties and responsibilities; 
- A structure that is attainable and realistic. 
In conclusion, the force structure of a reserve-component must clearly be recognizable, 
consistent, achievable, and understandable. 
2. Equipment 
The equipment for the reserve-component must be relevant to the task of the 
organization that it supports. The need to keep the equipment operationally ready is of 
paramount concern. Therefore, the equipment must be: 
Relevant to the organization's task 
- Operationally maintained with a minimum amount of maintenance time 
- Not of a type which is time-intensive with respect to training or which· . 
requires a high degree of technical training and sustainment 
3. Training 
Training should be considered the most critical item for a reserve-component, 
since time limitations put pressure on conducting quality-level training. With this 
limitation in mind, we can conclude that training needs to be standardized to maximize 
the effective use of available training time. Organizations must have training that has 
been evaluated and determined to be relevant to the tasks of the organization of force 
structure. For example, infantry squads must have standardized tasks that are universally 
established throughout the military structure. The training standard of an active-duty 
infantry squad should be the same as the reserve-component infantry squad. Training 
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time for a professional organization needs to be maximized to insure that all available 
time is utilized for mission-essential tasks. 
Although reserve-components historically conduct training at intervals within a 
training year (e.g., one weekend a month, two weeks a year), the level of proficiency 
correlates directly to the amount of time the unit actually trains for any given task. 
Bureaucratic requirements, though necessary, do not enhance the training-proficiency 
level of a unit. Therefore bureaucratic requirements should be minimized and training 
time maximized to accomplish the organization's war-fighting capabilities. 
A critical element for a .reserve-component is that the force structure be utilized to 
determine mission tasks, which are broken into two categories: sustainment training and 
mobilization. training. Sustainment training includes tasks that can be trained to 
proficiency during reserve status, or peacetinie mode .. Mobilization training tasks must 
be trained to proficiency immediately prior to the organization being committed to a 
combat environment. This time period relates di~ectly to the threat level faced by the 
nation under evaluation. Nations that have a high threat level usually must minimize the 
amount of mobilization time in order to commit their reserve forces as quickly as 
possible. This means that sustainment training is increased to accomplish the tasks that 
would be normally completed during the mobilization phase. Conversely, a country that 
has a lower threat level would most likely reduce sustainment training, increasing its 
mobilization training only in case of imminent war. As a result, nations can invert the 
time factors respectively, based on threat levels. This ability allows a country to tailor its 
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reserve forces to meet the needs of the national threat. A review of the standards for 
professional training includes: 
Standardized training that is universally used within the nation's defense 
structure 
Available training time that is maximized to accomplish war-fighting tasks 
Two categories of war-fighting tasks: 
- Sustainment: Those tasks to be accomplished during peace time 
- Mobilization: Those tasks not .trained on during peace time that must 
be achieved prior to deployment into combat operations 
4. Leadership 
The next area of concern for any professional military 'organization is the quality 
of its leadership. Depending on the organization and the nation's military structure, 
leadership can be found at various levels within the force. All militaries have some sort 
of an officer corps (leadership base), which provides direction for the organization. 
Several military systems contain a non-commissioned officer corps, which decentralizes 
the leadership to the lowest levels. Regardless of the nation's preference, for the 
leadership to be considered professional, Huntington's tenets of the. officer COrpS25 should 
be considered. These tenets are: 
(1) the organizing, equipping, and training of the force 
(2) the planning of its activities and 
(3) the direction of its operation in and out of combat 
25 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press: 1985) 11. 
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This explanation establishes the dynamics of the officer profession. However, it 
does not clearly quantify the variables needed. Huntington organizes the variables into 
three categories of characteristics significant to a military professional. The categories ar~ 
"the expertise of officership, the responsibility of officership, and the corporate character 
of officership. ,,26 Furthermore, Huntington indicates how an officer obtains the skills 
needed to be considered a professional military officer: 
The skill of the officer is neither a craft (which is primarily mechanical) 
nor an art (which requires unique and nontransferable talent). It is instead 
an extraordinarily complex intellectual skill requiring comprehensive 
study and training. 27 
This skill is formulated through years of military schooling in the operational arts, 
as well as through the practical experience achieved by trial and error: "The officer 
possesses intellectualized skill, mastery of which requires intense study. ,,28 Therefore, 
the military professional officer cannot be considered a true professional based on 
education alone. Although the educational aspects of the officer are critical, education 
must be accompanied by practical experience. 
The responsibility of an officer is an understanding that the officer is held 
accountable for his actions within the profession: 
The employment of his expertise promiscuously for his own advantage 
would wreck the fabric of society - his responsibility is the military 
security of his client-society.z9 
26 Ibid., 11, 14, and 16. 
27 Ibid., 13. 
28 Ibid., 15. 
29 Ibid., 14-15. 
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For the most part, the officer's motivation is not economic in nature, but involves 
a commitment to the profession of arms. Within the profession itself, there are guidelines 
and structures that clearly spell out what these responsibilities entaiL 
The corporate characteristics of officership are uniquely different from that of 
other professions. Military professionals must initially achieve their status within the 
organization through education in the skills that make them officers. However, the 
military professionals usually restrict their activities to that of the military society itself: 
The professional world of the officer tends to encompass an unusually 
high proportion of his activities. He normally lives and works apart from 
the rest of' society; physically and socially he probably has fewer 
nonprofessional contacts than most other professional men.30 
This corporate nature sets the military professional off from the rest of society and 
therefore clearly points to the standards set by the profession. The active-duty officer is. 
without a doubt a professional within the field of military operations. The level of 
training, the various degrees of expertise, along ~ith commitment and dedication aJ"e 
defmitely apparent in an active-duty officer. However, when we look at reserve-
component officers, we see an element quite different from their active-duty counterparts. 
The citizen-soldier, who is "part-time" does not match the model outlined by 
Huntington. However, with regard to expertise, the reserve-component officer should 
achieve the same level of formal military training as his active-duty counterpart. Most 
military organizations expose their officers to the same level of formal training regardless 
of component. 
30 Ibid., 16. 
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Furthermore, with regard to expertise, reserve officers should maintain their skills 
by performing their respective military duties on a consistent basis (most reserve-
components conduct training at least once a month). Therefore, if the officer corps of a 
reserve-component is trained and gains experience through a set, regimented training 
program, it will reasonably achieve Huntington's tenets of responsibility and expertise. 
However, the reserve officer corps may lack the extreme corporate mentality of the 
active-duty force. Of course, it will also lack the extreme degrees of corporativeness that 
can only be achieved in a closed military society, a society which can be viewed 
negatively since it is disconnected from society. Corporativeness is the fundamental 
difference between an active-duty and reserve force. 
Most reserve officers attempt to remain up-to-date, through military business, 
readings, and volunteer duty on.their personal time. However, level of expertise must be 
individually evaluated. To say that a reserve infantry officer does not reach the same 
level of expertise as his or her active-duty counterpart is a fair and equitable assessment. 
However, if one compares an engineer reserve officer (who has a compatible civilian skill 
in construction) to his active;duty counterpart (who is subjected to post details and other 
non-engineer missions), the scales tip in favor of the reserve-component officer. Since 
the reserve officer spends more time exercising the skills of construction than he would 
while on active military status, his reserve career is complemented by his civilian career. 
In addition, with the advent of the Internet and E-mail, the reserve officer can access 
military homepages (e.g., the Early Bird, RAND Corp., and many other military-related 
sites) to remain up-to-date on military trends and developments. Therefore, the level of 
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expertise that Huntington promotes needs to be evaluated on an individual and career-
track basis. 
To review, certain variables are needed to consider a reserve-component 
"professional." Table 3 lists these essential elements of what constitutes a professional 
reserve-.component. Utilizing this framework as a measuring stick, we can determine the 
level of professionalism within a reserve-component. 
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ORGANIZATION - Command and control, beginning with the 
civilian authority (republic or democratic 
system) which flows to the military, then 
down to the sub-organizations within the 
force structure 
- A structure that is consistent with other 
equivalent military organizations of that 
country's military force structure 
- The structure must be capable of 
accomplishing an assigned war-fighting 
mission 
- Clearly defined organizational structure: 
who, what position, what duty 
- Must be obtainable, realistic and 
achievable 
EQUIPMENT - Relevant to the organization's task 
- Maintenance time should be kept to a 
minimum in order to keep the equipment 
operational, so that valuable training time 
is not lost to maintenance 
- Of a variety that is not time intensive of 
training and requires a high degree of 
technical training and sustainment, thereby 
creating an unrealistic training time 
requirement 
- Equipment should be the same as its 
active-duty counterpart (modernization). 
TRAINING - Standardized training that is universally 
used within the nation's defense structure 
- Available training time is maximized to 
accomplish war-fighting tasks 
- The war-fighting tasks are identified and 
are broken into two categories 
- Sustainment: These tasks to be 
accomplished during peace time 
- Mobilization: Additional tasks that 
must be trained to standard prior to 
deployment into combat operations 
LEADERSHIP - Responsible 
- Expertise (TraininglExperience) 
Table 3. Key Elements to determme a ProfesslOnal Reserve-component 
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III. ESTONIAN CASE: THE FUTURE OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESERVE COMPONENTS 
A. mSTORICAL BACKGROUND AND SOCIAL CONDITION 
Estonians identify themselves as European, a claim that is supported by their 
culture, architecture, and demeanor. Estonia is the northernmost of the Baltic nations, 
which places it at the northern reaches of the European Continent. 
Estonia's past haS been marked with successive bloody empires that battled for 
and conquered land and people. Throughout its history, Estonia has been subjected to 
multiple conquests from early German Barons, Danes, Swedes, Poles, Russian Czars, 
Nazi Germany, and twice by'the Soviet Union. Subjected to over "seven hundred years 
of oppression,'.3l Es~onian society has maintained its sense of identity,- autonomy, and a 
desire for independence instilled within its ethos. This most notable latter attribute of 
Estonian society makes it ripe not only for independence, but also for a form of 
government that is conducive to individual rights and the rule of law. Through its many 
years of oppression (most recently under the Soviet Union), Estonians came to 
understand the valu~ of freedom and the protection of individual rights. Consequently 
they are understandably concerned about the future of their national security. 
Estonia gained independence from the Soviet Union on September 6,1991. It then 
adopted its former constitution from before the occupation. On June 28,1992, Estonia 
proclaimed that it had been occupied and was not a true member of the Soviet Union. 
31 John 0' Brien, Estonia, the Ouide Tallinn: Revalia Publishin Ltd, 1993 
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This significant event announced to the world the emergence of the Estonian 
state. Assessing the state of Estonia's society and its relationship with the republican 
principles is a difficult matter. The Soviet Union occupied Estonia for over forty years., 
Realistically speaking, "65% of the population, all those between the ages 15_64,,32 were 
born during the occupation, and did not undergo the freedoms experienced between 1918 
and 1938. Therefore, the morals and mores of the Soviet Union are embedded in the 
social fabric. According to COL (Ret) Guderjohn, the former Military Liaison Team 
Chief, "It will take a minimum of three generations of Estonians to break the grip of the 
insidious nature of the Soviet system of society. ,,33 
This understanding of Estonia's societal situation is a popular belief among many 
U.S. personnel who come in contact with Estonian society, including myself. These 
social norms cannot change overnight, and it will require time and nurturing for them to 
move towards a social climate conducive to a republican society .. Commenting on 
Estonian social capital, the Estonian Military Attache to Washington, LTC Tammalia, 
indicated that Estonians are "lazy about their participation in the Government activities 
(which is a legacy from Soviet times), and that elections are attracting approximately 
between 60-70% of the eligible voters. ,,34 
Although I understand Tammalia's concerns regarding apathy among the voting 
population of Estonia, I would counter that the United States, which is considered a 
32 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 1996-1997, Washington / London, Brassey's, 1996, 
133. 
33 Guderjohn, Larry W. COL, MLT Estonia Team Chief (EUCOM). Interviewed by author, 20 April 1998, 
e-mail, Tallinn Estonia. 
34 Tammela, LTC Estonian Military Attache to the United States. Interviewed by author, 22 Sept 1998, 
Washington D.C. 
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consolidated democracy, only realizes a conservative 45-48% voter tum out in a given 
year. This is considerably less than the Estonian level of participation. However, 
Tammalia's interpretation of the impact on Estonian society by the Soviet occupation 
raises an important issue and should be taken into consideration with relationship to 
Estonia's transition to a republican society. 
With respect to participation in the democratic process, the RAND Corporation, 
which provides democratic ratings for most countries, indicates that Estonia "in 1983 
[Soviet era] had a democratic rating of 0.0 and in 1993 showed a marked increase with a 
democratic rating of 75.0.,,35 
There are those in the political science arena who believe that the true mark of a 
nation's growth in the direction of democracy is the transfer of power from one political 
party to another .. Estonia has shown that it can change governments successfully and 
without violence since the "Estonian government has turned over from the Pro Patria 
Coalition to the Koonderakond coalition in 1995.,,36 
Another critical element is the involvement of the population in the democratic 
process. "Social capital within the nation is not very large, but outside of the country 
many Estonians seem to gather together (those who escaped Estonia at the end of World 
War II - war refugees).,,37 This reluctance to gather in groups at home may be due to the 
influence of the former Soviet Union, which did not encourage groups to congregate. 
35 The RAND Corporation. Unknown Copyright. Available [Online]: <http://www.rand.org/> [19 April 
1998]. 
36 Tamrnela, LTC Estonian Military Attache to the United States. Interviewed by author, 22 Sept 1998, 
Washington D.C .. 
37 Ibid. 
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However, a key indicator of the Estonian culture is that those Estonians who are allowed 
freedoms in other countries gather together in great numbers to support not only Estonia, 
but to keep their cultural traditions alive. The potential for social capital within Estonian 
society clearly exists, but needs time to develop. 
The NDL provides a strong example of such social capital. Prior to World War IT 
"the Kaitseliit [NDL], with its special organizations had 100,000 members. At that time 
was one tenth of the population of Estonia and presented expressive proof of the nation's 
will to defend itself. ,,38 
"During June 1940 the occupation by the Soviet Union, the Kaitseliit [NDL] was 
one of the first organizations to be prohibited, and the members of the Kaitseliit [NDL] 
became victims of especially cruel repression. ,,39 
Shortly after the occupation ended, the NDL has manifested a rapid resurgence. by 
"uniting over 8,000 Kaitseliit [NDL] members and together with the special organization 
there are over 12,000 members. ,,40 
The NDL is a clear example of social capital, since its structure contains 
organizations from various segments of society. The "Women's Home Defense, Young 
Eagles, and Home Daughters,,41 are organizations similar to the U.S. Boy Scouts, and 
Girl Scouts respectively. This represents approximately .008 percent of the "1,436,558 
(July 1997 est.),,42 Estonian population, and this percentage is growing. 
38' Kaitseliit, 1997, Estonian Defense League "Pamphlet". Tallinn Estonia: Author. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. Author 
42 Joint Contact Team Program. 21 April 1998. Available [Online]. 
<http://www.eucom.miUprograms/jctp/> [22 April 1998]. 
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These organizations teach social skills and are community based within each 
"Malev" (a country district, of which there are 15). This unique example illustrates that 
fact that when afforded the right to gather (in this case for the nation's defense) the 
Estonians are quite capable of building social capital. As Estonians become more 
comfortable with their new freedoms, the expansion of groups .and organizations will 
support the social base needed for any Republican society. 
Additionally, Estonians have begun to flock to other types of social and cultural 
organizations. Within Estonia today, there are "nine cultural societies, twenty-seven 
environmental, or ecological organizations, four folk culture groups, twenty-six literary 
societies, fifteen museums, and forty-two people type organizations. ,,43 
The existence of these organizations indicates that Estonian social capital is quite 
capable of growing and providing the impetus to shape ~e nation's development through 
involvement in organizations, groups, and ultimately concerned communities. It can also 
be contended that in addition to social evolvement a democratic nation needs a well-
educated population, since a well-informed populace understands the dynamics of the 
democratic political process. Being informed, educate~ voters can express their views 
through their votes. The RAND Corporation indicated that "Estonia has a 96% adult 
literacy rate, and that on the average Estonians obtain nine years of schooling. ,,44 This 
literacy rate is considered substantial since most countries listed in the same report 
indicated adult literacy rates in the 75-80% range. Additionally, Estonians pride 
43 Estonian World Wide Web. Copyright Unknown. Available [Online] <hup://www.ee/www/Culture_and 
Society/welcome.html> [26 October 1998]. 
44 The RAND Corporation. Unknown Copyright. Available [Online]: <http://www.rand.org!> [19 April 
1998]. 
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themselves in hosting one of the oldest universities in Europe. The Tartu University in 
Tartu Estonia provides a host of higher education courses, including medicine, 
engineering, social science, and astronomy are but a few of the subjects offered by this 
prestigious university. The city of Tartu revolves around the university and prides itself 
in being a center for learning and academic development. 
Throughout the country there has been an increase in the number of higher 
educational institutions since Soviet occupation: 
In 1980, during Soviet times there were six (6) higher educational 
institutions within Estonia: Shortly after the occupation, the number 
increased significantly in 1993 to twenty-two (22). As of 1997, there are 
thirty-five (35) higher educational institutions located in Estonia. It 
should be noted that in 1995, higher education could be obtained in one 
vocational educational institution.45 
Pride associated with education encourages members of society to continue to 
develop educationally. This attitude towards education is deeply engrained in the ethos 
of Estonian society and promises to yield future generations great success in the area of 
higher education. As the walls of oppression have been lowered many Estonians have 
seized the opportunity to continue their studies in foreign countries. This clearly shows 
the Estonia's desire to improve its educational systems. 
Economics also play an important part in the social arena. The interdependence 
of economic and society is inherently reflected in the political process. As we have seen 
historically, the independent citizen is concerned about not only his or her rights 
(individual freedoms), but also about the security of property within a democracy. 
45 Estonian Higher Educational Institutions. Copyright Unknown, Available [Online] 
<http://www.stat.ee/wwwstatlcontentlCS_SL_UKll.html> [20 October 1998]. 
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Democracies are inherently linked to their economic stability. Events in Asia clearly 
showed how closely government stability is tied to economic stability and confidence. 
Estonian economic initiatives can easily be called aggressive in nature and forward-
thinking: 
Estonian government has pursued an ambitious program of market 
reforms and stabilization measures, which is rapidly transforming the 
economy .. Three years after independence and two years after the 
introduction of the kroon (Estonian currency), Estonians are beginning to 
reap tangible benefits; inflation though still high, was brought down to 
about 2% per month in the second half 1994; production declines have 
bottomed out with estimated growth of 4% in 1994; and living standards 
are rising.46 
The Estonian economy had been the most efficient, by Soviet standards, during 
the occupation (especially in areas such as agriculture). Although it still suffered during 
that time period because it was not afforded the opportunity to meet its full potential. 
However even before independence, Estonians were focused on posturing themselves for 
economic reforms and linking with the West. "Estonia's foreign trade has shifted rapidly 
from East to West; the Western industrialized countries now account for two-thirds of 
foreign trade. ,,47 Estonian economic planners within government institutions have not 
been the only source of improvement to the economic conditions of Estonia. The private 
sector has shown marked improvement si!lce independence. 
The private sector is growing rapidly; the share of the state enterprises in 
the economy has steadily declined, and by late 1994 accounted for only 
40% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)48 





Estonia has been credited with being one of the first nations coming out of the 
Soviet Union to establish a legitimate currency, the kroon, in "August 1992.,,49 "Kroons 
are tied to the German Deutschmark at a fixed rate of 8 to 1 ,,50 which shows the 
progressive and international foresight projected by the Estonian financial planners. 
With the economy showing signs of long-term improvement, the Estonian 
standard of living slowly rising, and confidence in economic reforms the Estonian 
economic stability is on the increase. This allows the development of a society that can 
experience economic independence from government controls. This economic situation 
eliminates the need for dependence on the government. The ability to exercise economic 
freedom frees the society from· governmental control and separates the political process 
from economic realities. Although it is impossible to completely sever the ties between a 
government and its economy , the less controls imposed on the economy by the 
government, the better the conditions for the democratic process. However, the economy 
must remain healthy and show signs of growth and stability for security within tlie 
society and confidence in the political system to exist. 
The comprehensive overview of Estonian soci<?ty shows that it has a unique 
potential for social capital, economic progressiveness, and an educated populace striving 
for greater information in the academic realm. All these factors indicate a society that is 
well-suited for republican ideas. This also shows that the social fabric of Estonia is also 




Still, in the early stages of organizational development the willingness of the members of 
the Estonian society to embrace a once outlawed organization (during Soviet times) 
shows the social base commitment to the nation. 
Based on the items I have presented, I feel that the social base of Estonia appears 
able to ~upport the existence of a reserve component. Although still feeling the effects of 
the former Soviet Union, the progressive nature of the Estonians will provide the means 
for this end .. The NDL's early advances clearly reflect community support and the 
commitment of the populace to the security of the Estonian State. Time remains the 
enemy as the Estonians rebuild their entire way of life. The military is only one element 
of the overall dynamics of Estonian society, but the real world security concerns 
confronting Estonia insure that this issue will remain high on the priority list. In 
. conclusion, the Estonian society is ripe for the citizen-soldier concept, and the NDL 
appears to be the tool to this end, with respect to· the Estonian society's embrace of this 
organization so soon after independence. 
B. GOVERNMENTAL EVOLUTION 
To understand any country, it is critical that we become familiar with its system 
of government and institutions. The values ofa society are normally contained within its 
constitution, which should state the fundamental value system, and how the governmental 
institutions operate. 
The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia was proclaimed on February 24,1918, 
and the country was forcefully occupied by the Soviets in 1938. The Constitution was 
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reestablished by referendum on June 28,1992, and adopted the following chapters 
presented in Table 4: 
Chapter I General Provision 
Chapter II Fundamental Rights, Freedoms and Duties 
Chapter III The Peo~le 
Chapter IV The Riigikogu (Parliament) 
Chapter V The President of the Republic 
Chapter VI The Government of the Republic 
Chapter VII Legislation 
Chapter VIII Finance and the State Budget 
Chapter IX Foreign Relations and International Treaties 
Chapter X National Defense 
Chal'terXi The State Audit Office 
Chapter XII The Legal Chancellor 
ChapterXm The Courts 
Chapter XIV Local Governments 
Chapter XV Amendment of the Constitution 
The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia 
Implementation Act 
Table 4. Chapters of the Estoman ConstItutIon 
The Government of Estonia has, through legislation, established the legal base for 
the rule of law within the elements of the Constitution. The focus of this chapter is on the 
legal aspect of the Constitution and governmental institutions that legitimize present 
military organizations. The Estonian Constitution specifies "National Defense,,51 under 
Chapter X. Chapter X clearly outlines the authority of the civilian government during 
times of peace and war. Chapter X Section 127 states: "the supreme commander of 
national defense is the President of the Republic, ,,52 and establishes civilian authority 
over the military. Chapter X Section 127 also establishes a National Defense Council as 
51 Estonian Constitution 3 November 1996, Available [Online]: ]: <webmaster@rk.ee> [23 May 1998] 
52 Ibid 
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an advisory body with membership provided by law. There is also a proviso, which 
delineates leadership within the Defense structure during times of peace and war: 
The Estonian Defense Forces and national defense organizations shall be 
led by the Commander of the Defense Forces in peace-time, and by the 
Commander in Chief of the Defense Forces in war-time. The Commander 
and the Commander-in-Chief of the Defense Forces shall be appointed to 
and released from office by the Riigikogu (Parliament), on the proposal of 
the President of the Republic.53 
This Chapter of the Constitution clearly outlines: a) the authority of the civilian 
gov~rnment over the military, b) provisions for leadership during times of war and. peace, 
c) procedures of declaration of war, d) emergency mobilization against an aggression 
(with time constraints), e) threats to the Estonian constitutional order, f) restrictions of 
rights and freedoms of citizens during times or war or national emergency, g) time 
periods when a resolution has to be reached by the Riigikogu. These provisions are the 
essential elements of the establishment of the military and its operati~n under civilian 
authority. 
The legislation authorizing the legitimacy of a reserve military structure is found 
in the "Kaitseliit [NDL] Statutes, which was confirmed by the President of the Republic 
on May 2,1931.,,54 It firmly o~tlines the missions of the NDL which include: 
53 Ibid. 
54 Guderjohn, Larry W. COL, MLT Estonia Team Chief (EUCOM). Interviewed by author, 20 April 1998, 
e-mail, Tallinn Estonia, and in person 23 Sept 1998. 
55 
Assistance to legal authorities in defending Estonian Constitutional Regime 
and security of citizens 
Participation in disaster relief operations 
Military Training and education of its members 
Enforcement of Patriotic and National feelings in citizens 
"Execution of other missions given to Kaitseliit [NDL] by legal means. ,,55 
These statutes formally put into effect in 1931, were modified in 1995 to add: 
Kaitseliit [NDL] is a voluntary association with military structure which 
owns weapons and conducts military exercises - Peacetime. National 
Defense Law, par. 8, section 2, confirmed on 6 February 1995. 56 
Clearly, the legislation that authorizes the legal establishment of the NDL exists. 
These institutional frameworks provide the Estonian defense establishment with a reserve 
. force. However, the NDL is a volunteer organization that does not get substantial support 
from the government. Its volunteers receive no compensation, and for the most part 
purchase and maintain their own equipment aside from the mere stocks provided by the 
government. Although legislation is in place to support the NDL legally, no material 
substance is provided to integrate the organization within the Estonian defensive posture. 
Therefore, this volunteer organization is fundamentally on its own and obtains 
monetary support through its own devices. Some means of gaining revenue may even be 
considered questionable. Although, the institutional framework exists, it lacks the 




active part of the Estonian defense community. Yet, organizationally, the NDL is 
expected to contribute to defense activities in times of emergency and maintains a chain 
of command within the defense structure (which is cl,lrrently under revision). 
The gradient level of involvement by civilian authority over the military, contains 
several key areas that can help us determine if Estonia's defense structure is truly living 
up to the legal parameters of the Constitution through civilian control and oversight. 
When interviewed on several issues concerning the involvement of civilians in defense 
policymaking, Tammela clearly stated that civilian involvement exists within Estonia: 
The military is totally under the purview of civilian policy at the highest 
levels. Civilians are involved at every level, but at the local level there are 
some separations, due to a lack of clearly defined roles. 57 
Although at times it appears that there is friction over military policy and 
programs between tne military leaders and the civilian· authority (which is the proper 
balance), there is no doubt that the civil authority remains superior to the military. 
An issue which best demonstrates this friction relates to the recent debates within the 
Estonian Defense community over commissioned officer education: 
The Ministry of Defense and General Staff have a difference of opinion on 
the subject of officer education, but in the end, if both sides listen to each 
other, they can come up with a comprehensive program. The key 
ingredients of each, political issues and tactical employment are both 
needed. In the final analysis a mix of each will improve the leadership 
training within the Estonian military. 58 . 
57 Tammela, LTC Estonian Military Attache to the United States. Interviewed by author, 22 Sept. 1998, in 
£erson Washington D.C.. 
8 Guderjohn, Larry W. COL, MLT Estonia Team Chief (EUCOM). Interviewed by author, 20 April 1998, 
e-mail, Tallinn Estonia, and in person 23 Sept 1998. 
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At this time there is an agreement by both the Ministry of Defense and General 
Staff that officer training should focus on professionalism. At this time, there is a 
committee reviewing the aspects of officer training. 
As the Estonian defense establishment wrestles with critical policies and 
procedures related to operational issues, differences of opinion between military leaders 
and their civilian counterparts can be expected. As long as this arena does not become 
adversarial, the civilian-military relationship will be a healthy environment for the 
creation of future policies. However, one thing that has been lacking within the Estonian 
Ministry is a large number of civilians with an understanding of military management 
procedures. Understanding this shortfall, the civilian leadership within Estonia has taken 
positive steps to rectify the situation. The Estonian Ministry of Defense has sent 
members of the Ministry to foreign democratic countries to learn about subjects ranging 
from the military budgeting procedures (Programming Planning Budgeting System -
PPBS) to civil military relations and international security courses. 
This comprehensive effort is designed to train civilians in defense management 
matters so that "soldiers in civilian clothing" do not inundate the Estonian Ministry of 
Defense. On the same issue, the civilians running the military must be uniquely aware of 
security issues, procurement, and policy matters, and must be the conduit between the 
current civilian-elected leadership and the military. The civilian leadership within 
Estonia has shown great foresight in this area, since currently there is a member of the 
Ministry of Defense and a member of the General Staff attending the Civil-Military 
Relations and International Security program at the Naval Postgraduate School located in 
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Monterey California. In addition, there is another member of the Ministry of Defense 
scheduled to attend in the 1999 course. By taking advantage of programs of this nature, 
the Ministry will employ civilians who understand the dynamics of the defense 
community. 
Another essential indicator that confirms civilian authority is the budget. Defense 
expenditure was for "1995 $34.1 million (exchange rate conversion), almost 5% of the 
overall State budget and 1.5% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). ,,59 With a budget 
of "revenues: $643 million, and expenditures: $639 million,,6o the resources for 
improvement are just not available. However, through creative measures and foreign 
support in the form of weapons, training and materials from the West, the Estonian 
Defense Forces seem to be improving their capabilities. A salient point to derive from 
this information is that the Estonian military budget is controlled by the civilian authority, .. 
which is mandated to maintain a balanced budget. Although, in recent years, there has 
been an effort to raise the defense budget, the Riigikogu (Parliament) has not focused 
significantly on the military. 
Another way to examine the civilian oversight within the Estonian Defense 
structure is to look at how the organization itself establishes a clear chain of command. 
This chain should begin with civilian authority (President) in accordance with the 
Constitution, and flow smoothly to the operational units. As can be seen in Figure 3 the 
flow goes from the President directly to the Commander in Chief of Defense forces, then 
it flows in two directions: 1) To the Defense League (NDL) , and 2) General Staff of 
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Defense forces and from there to the operational units. There is 'another flow, which 
appears to be for appropriations and policy issues. This flow begins with the Riigikogu 
(Parliament) and goes to the Ministry of Defense, then to the Department of Defense. 
From there, issues go directly to the Defense League and General Staff of Defense forces. 
Therefore, within the Estonian National Defense structure, there are two clearly outlined 
paths of command and control. One process within the chain represents a command 
relationship and the other indicates appropriations and policy. All segments of the 
Ministry are led by civilians whether they are elected officials or government workers 
(bureaucracy). Then civilian-created military policy goes to the General Staff for 
implementation in the operational units. This leaves little doubt that the civilian authority 
leads the Estonian military. 
Contained in Figure 4 is the organization structure of the Ministry of Defense. 
This clearly shows the. roles that the civilian authority assumes within the defense 
community. There is a Department of Budget and Finance, which controls budgetary 
matters and includes an accounting office. Also within the structure is the Department of 
Military Service, which .oversees over education, mobilization, and military service. 
Although still evolving, the structure clearly defines civilian authority over the military, 
and its involvement with defense matters. 
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C. KEY ISSUES IN ESTONIAN FORCE STRUCTURE 
1. External Threats 
When looking at Estonia's potential threat, the most likely candidate is Russia to 
the East. As Russia transitioned from the former Soviet Union, it has experience, a 
military coup, economic instability, food shortages, and high levels of unemployment. 
Russia cannot be considered stable, since there are no short-term solutions to these and 
many other internal problems. With hard-~iners like Alexander Lebed waiting to succeed 
Boris Yeltsin, Russia's internal problems can easily translate into external aggression. To 
date, relations between Estonia and Russia can be considered strained, since critical 
issues concerning border locations and treatment of Russian nationals within Estonia 
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continue to create an atmosphere of mutual distrust. Estonians continue to fear Russia 
because of sheer size, recent historical occupation, and Russian aggressive attitudes 
towards Estonia and the Baltic nations. Russian security concerns towards the 
Kaliningrad enclave (Oblast) remain high and therefore it watches the west very closely. 
As a result, Russian troop strength along the border remains at high levels. "Recent large 
scale Airborne operations conducted sixty kilometers from the Estonian border (facing 
west) sent waves of concern through the Estonian government. ,,61 
Additionally, twenty eight percent of Estonia's population is Russian. For the 
most part, the Estonian government has been benevolent towards granting Russians 
Estonian citizenship, but many retain their Russian national connection. This creates an 
internal security concern, with external implications. Any negative issues concerning 
Estonian-Russians are going to attract the attention of it.s eastern neighbor. This internal 
security problem takes the form of a potential "Fifth Column" which can actively work 
against Estonian authority through subversion arid providing information to mother 
Russia. This unique problem cannot be solved easily since protection of Russian citizens 
within Estonia is an implied tenet of the Estonian Constit~tion. 
Although there have been border and fishing disputes with Latvia to the south, 
these have simply been viewed as growing pains. With cooperation in other ventures 
including military cooperation like BAL TBAT (Baltic Battalion), Latvia can not be 
considered a threat to Estonian sovereignty. Other regional actors like Finland and 
61 Toom, Aivar 2LT, Estonian Defense Force (General Staff). Interviewed by author, 24 May 1998, in 
person, Monterey, California. 
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Sweden have provided considerable assistance to Estonia and cannot be considered a 
military or 1?olitical threat. Therefore, with a sizable military, unstable government, and 
large-scale domestic concerns, Russia is Estonia's paramount menace to national 
sovereignty. 
2. . Domestic Considerations 
The most significant issues revealed in this research is that Estonia, as a nation, is 
moving progressively, and aggressively, towards a consolidated democratic environment 
capable of supporting the institutions of a republican society. The key elements of this 
can be found in the society and governmental institutions. With respect to a reserve 
component, this research has found several issues that merit further consideration and 
study. 
Within the Estonian society, it is clear that social capital is on the rise. Diverse 
groups and organizations are forming in all spectrums of society. These groups are 
actively participating in events that were not encouraged during the occupation. This 
clearly points to a social base capable of group participation, and involved with its 
surroundings. Social capital is critical to .a republican form of g;overnment since it 
indicates that people are involved. Although not developed to its fullest potential, the 
fact that Estonians are beginning to utilize their freedoms is a clear sign of progress. 
Time will be the issue, since the wounds of Soviet oppression will take many years to 
heal. However, since individual liberties are somewhat new to the vast majority of 
Estonians who where born and raised under Soviet rule, the progress seen to date is 
impressively encouraging. 
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Another indicator of a progressive republican society is the education of the 
populace. As we have clearly seen, the Estonians place a high value on education. The 
increase in the number of institutions of higher learning shows the strength of 
commitment by the society and the governmental institutions that support them. An 
educate<i man is less likely to allow the yoke of oppression to be placed around his neck. 
Only through an informed civil society can a consolidated democratic system of 
government successfully thrive. 
Economically speaking, Estonia's aggressive move forward, with the innovative 
movement of businesses into the private sector, provides the economic stability needed 
for a democratic nation to effectively. Through a conscious energetic effort to establish 
trade with the West, Estonia has established itself as an up-and-coming economic player 
. within the international community. This is evident from·the fact that two-thirds of the 
foreign trade is conducted with the industrialized West. As a result, this economic 
stability provides the freedom needed by any democratic society. Through economic 
independence, the civil society is capable of making rational choices within the 
democratic framework, free of influence and controls by governmental institutions. This 
leverage has shifted effectively to the Estonian population. 
As for the governmental institutions contained within Estonia, the decision to 
adopt the original Constitution from 1918 not only provides for the legitimacy of Estonia, 
but it sets up two interesting premises. First, it invalidates the Soviet government during 
the time of occupation. Second, it utilizes a comprehensive document produced at a time 
when national interest flourished. This duality allows the governmental institutions to 
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move onto other more pressing issues and using the existing framework of Estonian 
values, and avoid "recreating the wheel". 
The Estonian Constitution contains a chapter devoted strictly to "National 
Defense" (Chapter X) which sets up the parameters of a legitimized military within 
Estonian society. The Constitution contains the critical elements needed to provide for a 
civilian chain of command, and outlines the actions of the governmental institutions 
during peacetime and war. Although in need of some fine-tuning, the document is 
comprehensive and establishes the authority of the civilians over the military. 
The gradient leverage of civilian authority is still new to the Estonian military 
organizational framework. This is a direct impact of the fact that many within the 
military structure have served with the Soviet military. As time creates distance from 
"the old ways", and situations that lend themselves to compromise and communication 
arise, this will eventually work itself out. 
By looking at the key ingredients of civilian leverage over the military, we clearly 
see that the civilian authority controls the budget, establishes the leadership doctrine, and 
chooses the military leaders ,of high posts. As the boundaries of respo~sibility between 
the military and civilian authority are established, a more effective and efficient 
comprehensive bureaucratic system will develop. Although there may never be a clear 
"cookie cutter" approach to solving problems confronting the Estonian military 
institutions. The civilian leadership will always maintain ultimate control. 
The Estonians appear to be experimenting with a centralized reserve structure. 
During the summer of 1998, the first "muster" was conducted, which provided a 
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manpower pool for the active service. This system being too new to determine its 
effectiveness this research will focus on the NDL as a reserve structure. 
The NDL is a legitimate and recognized organization within the Estonian defense 
structure. Estonian law provides for the NDL to "assist legal authorities in defending 
Estonian Constitutional Regime and Security of citizens. ,,62 Therefore it is a legal 
organization Gapable of conducting military operations for the defense of the Estonian 
State. This means that during a time of mobilization the NDL will be needed to defend 
the nation. The law provides for this requirement. 
When the variables outlined in previous chapters are applied to the NDL, the 
NDL reveals several positives as well as negatives. The first positive aspect is that the 
organization shows signs of the citizen-soldier concept. That members of the community 
willingly volunteer their time and effort to the defense of the Estonian State is clearly the 
hallmark of the citizen-soldier concept. This civil involvement and sense of 
responsibility has a "win-win" effect for Estonian society in that is provides for the 
defense of the nation and produces the social capital needed to sustain a democratic 
society. 
The second positive result is that individual and small unit competition reveals 
that the Estonian citizen-soldier is capable of maintaining an effective level of combat 
readiness. However a standardized level of readiness must be established to insure that 
training is conducted to achieve this goal. 
62 Larry W. Guderjohn, COL, MLT Estonia Team Chief (EUCOM). Interviewed by author. 20 April 
1998,e-mail, Tallinn Estonia, and in person 23 Sept 1998 
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The third positive aspect of the Estonian military is its leadership. Although it is 
experiencing readjustment pains while moving from the Soviet style to a more Western 
philosophy, the senior level leaders are focusing on the future. By sending members of 
the military to Western nations for leadership training, the Estonian military is learning 
the leadership tools of professional service. These aspects will take time, and within the 
NDL it will be even longer in coming, but the elements are being developed and put 
into place now. This will provide the Estonian military the capability of providing 
dynamic leaders at the needed levels. 
A negative aspect pf the NDL is that the organization may be too much of a social 
organization and not a professional military unit. It is not capable of conducting combat 
operations at the battalion (approximately 500 man size units) level or higher. Though 
'the Malev is about the organizational size of a United States Army Brigade, it contains 
within its structure, groups like the Women's League, the Young Eagle, and other non': 
combatant groups (band,etc.). Therefore, within this Brigade size organization the 'unit 
that can be considered combat-capable is about Battalion-size (this will vary between 
Malev to Malev since demographics and population dictate available manpower). This 
constitutes the war-fighting apparatus within the Malev. Getting through the 
organizational layers within the Malev and fielding the war-fighting asset may be a 
difficult venture. This would be particularly difficult if the Malev's combat assets are to 
be used in conjunction with other (active duty) Estonian military assets in support of 
national military objectives. 
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A second negative aspect is the problem with the organization of the combat 
assets within the Malev. My research indicated that the units contained in the Malev do 
not mirror their active-duty counterparts. Organizationally, their structure may b~ 
incapable of performing the same level of tasks, and their relative combat power may 
vary from unit to unit based on formations and equipment. This creates a conglomeration 
of units with varying levels of combat capabilities, resulting in a command and control 
problem of the highest order in terms of national defense strategy. 
The resourcing of the NDL is accomplished through its own initiatives. The 
Estonian central government provides little monetary assistance to the NDL, yet the NDL 
has presence within the General Staff and Defense establishments. This could create a 
quasi-Mafia style organization if not monitored closely. "Bake sales" and "raffles" are 
insufficient for resourcing a combat organization. Therefore, more innovative (and 
possibly less legal) means of resourcing could be sought. The potential for misconduct is 
there. In many former Eastern bloc countries, we have seen the rise of organized crime 
and the involvement of people with military training in criminal activities. 
The equipping of the NDL is difficult to do within the constraints of the Estonian 
defense budget. Although there are efforts to provide new weapons through the United 
States Security Assistance to Estonia, the current situation lends itself to becoming a 
logistic nightmare during combat operations. With the various types of weapons and 
equipment currently in the NDL inventory, a national standardized logistic system is 
nearly impossible. The Estonian leadership has not been able to solve the logistic 
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problem to date. Although the leadership has determined this to be a significant problem, 
the solutions are years from being achieved within the current budgetary limitations 
The NDL's training suffers the same fate as its active duty counterpart in that it 
lacks the standardized training unit commanders needed to maintain an elevated level of 
combat readiness. Training differs between units, and different techniques are used based 
on the training experience of the unit cadre and commanders. This creates a planning and 
deployment nightmare, since units trained by different standards will not operate as 
similar entities and will cause serious command and control problems. Although I 
understand a standardized training manual is under development, one does not exist at 
this time. Therefore determining sustainment and mobilization criteria for training is not 
presently possible. 
The conciusion of this case study is that bas~d on the indicators that I have' 
outlined, Estonia is progressively moving forward towards a consolidated democracy. If 
this current trend continues, the social base will be conducive to a reserve component 
made up of citizen-soldiers. As the society moves further away from the Soviet 
influence, it will develop the key components for bein,g a successful democratic state. 
Therefore, with limited resources, a social base that has shown progressive signs of 
embracing republican principles, the atmosphere for the citizen-soldier and its advantages 
are real possibilities for the future. 
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D. CURRENT DEFENSE STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION 
The idea of a professional reserve component is extremely attractive to many of 
the newly independent post-Soviet states. Many of those states are faced with economic, 
political, cultural, and social turmoil. For the most part the militaries within these 
Eastern European countries have remained docile during the transitional phase, and have 
been subjected to extensive draw downs and cutbacks due to economic concerns. Since a 
professional reserve component can open up new dynamics to military defensive 
structures, Estonia can be a test case. As its neighbor to the east (Russia) still maintains a 
sizable military presence, and minor border disputes to the east and south pose a threat to 
Estonian autonomy, an effective military structure is imperative. 
The opening ··paragraph of the ~stonian Constitution sets the tone of Estonian 
commitment to Defense 
With unwavering faith and a steadfast will to strengthen and develop the 
state, which is established on the inextinguishable right of the people of 
Estonia to national self-determination and which was proclaimed on 24 
February 1998, which is founded on liberty, justice and law, which shall 
protect internal and external peace, and is a pledge to present and future 
generations for their social progress and welfare63 
Additionally, in Chapter X of the Estonian Constitution, the National Defense 
Policy is established. This chapter clearly provides for a military, national conscription 
and the governmental responsibilities during peacetime and times of war. Under 
p~agraph 126 of Chapter X it is stated: "The organization of the Estonian Defense 
63 Estonian Constitution 3 November 1996, Available [Online]: <webmaster@rkee> [23 May 1998]. 
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Forces and National Defense organizations shall be provided by law.,,64 This establishes 
several different organizations for the defense of Estonia. Currently the Estonia military 
structure consists of 
Ground Forces (Estonian Defense Forces - EDF, Navy, Air, and Air 
Defense Force (not officially sanctioned), Maritime Border Guard, 
Volunteer Defense League (NDL), Security Forces (internal and border 
troops) and a Coast Guard.65 
Given its current population, the available manpower within Estonia is "396,588 
males ages 15-49: 311,838 males fit for military service; 11,915 males reaching military 
age (18) annually (1995 est.).,,66 Not all of these males are capable of serving in the 
active forces at the same time. Estonia has neither the budget nor the will to maintain a 
large standing army. With Estonia's security concerns, the only recourse is an effective 
reserve-component system able to quickly mobilize the available manpower. 
Estonia will not have the luxury of a large build up time for combat operations. The 
combat power needed to stem an aggressive act against Estonia must be quickly 
accessible, and capable of demonstrating Estonia's will for national survival. 
Currently, the Estonian leadership is working with two reserve force concepts: 1) 
The NDL (Kaitseliit), which is community based within the 15 districts located in Estonia 
and 2) the National Reserve system, which conducted its fust "muster" within the last 
year. The following discussion focuses on the NDL, its current status, and its level of 
proficiency. 
64 Ibid. 




Since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the NDL (NDL) has 
reemerged within Estonia. This organization which was first established in late autumn 
1918 was designed as a "National self-initiated defense organization.,,67 Its charter was 
the "unitary real defense of the Independent Republic of Estonia, which organized the 
brave patriotically minded Estonian men to establish order in the young state of Estonia 
and provided for the safety for citizens. ,,68 
During its early years the NDL provided the Republic with active defense against 
the occupying Germans and later thwarted the Bolshevik rebellion on December 1, 1924 
from becoming a threat to the Estonian nation. Just prior to Wodd War II the NDL, 
a well organized force representing the whole nation, had been formed, 
and was excellently trained, especially in marksmanship training. At that 
time together with its special organizations the Kaitseliit [NDL] had 
100,000 members (one tenth of the Estonian po£ulation) and was an 
expressive proof of the nation's will to defend itself. 9 
However, before the Soviet occupation prior to Wodd War II, the government 
required: 
all weapons belonging to the Kaitseliit [NDL], to be turned in, effectively 
eliminating any potential form of resistance to the overwhelming Soviet 
might. Many Estonians feel that the Government in place in 1930, sold 
out the Estonian Republic.7o . 
There is great controversy today over this issue, since Soviet might could have 
quickly crushed an active resistance, while many believe the Estonia resistance within the 
NDL could have been quite effective against the Soviets. The historical fact was that the 
67 Kaitseliit, 1997, Estonian Defense League "Pamphlet". Tallinn Estonia: 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Toom, Aivar 2LT, Estonian Defense Force (General Staff). Interviewed by author, 24 May 1998, in 
person, Monterey California. 
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NDL was never allowed to take the field and prove its capabilities in the 1930s, as it had 
done in 1918. 
During World War II, members of the organization fought on both sides of the 
conflict, since both sides occupied Estonia. After the end of the war, Soviet occupation 
prohibited the NDL from being a recognized organization, because of its nationalistic 
mentality. 
Although the Kaitseliit [NDL] does not trace its lineage to the "Forest 
Brothers" (the resistance organization that lasted ten years against Soviet 
occupation), many members of the former Kaitseliit [NDL] actively 
participated in the resistance movement.7! 
The NDL has resurfaced after over forty years of remaining dormant. This· quasi-
military organization represents the first reserve military organization within the Estonian 
Defense structure. Since Estonian Independence, many Estonians have become actively 
involved with the NDL and within five short years its numb.ers increased to 
approximately "8,000 Kaitseliit [NDL] members, and together with the special 
organizations there are. over 12,000 members (Women's home defense, Young Eagles, 
Home Daughters, Staft)."n This represents approximately .008 percent of the "1,436,558 
(July 1997 est.),,73 Estonian population. 
It is evident that the NDL represents the reserve component and citizen-soldier 
concept within the Estonian nation. The question that remains however is whether the 
71 Ibid. 
72 Kaitseliit, 1997, Estonian Defense League "Pamphlet". Tallinn Estonia: 
73 Joint Contact Team Program. 21 April 1998. Available [Online] 
<http://www.eucom.mi1Iprograms/jctp/> [22 April 1998]. 
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NDL constitutes a professional organization. That can be assessed made by 
using the variables that I have outlined in earlier chapters. 
1. Organization 
The organization of the NDL is based on its own internal structure and is not 
comparable to the Estonian Defense Force. Although the missions of the NDL and its 
geographical dispersion is somewhat different from that of the active army, the combat 
unit's organization should be fundamentally the same if interoperability is to be achieved. 
While the organization of the Estonian Defense Force units are designed for war-fighting 
missions, the design of th~ combat sub-units of the NDL do not follow the same 
organizational structure. It is assumed that some of these units are tailored for combat 
operations, but are configured differently and do not mirror their war fighting active duty 
counterparts. 
The NDL has a clearly defined structure, which provides for a functional 
command trace, and a staff section. This structure is comprehensible, and easily 
understood in military terms as seen in Figure 5. An organization known as a Malev is 
set up within each of Estonia's fIfteen provinces. Th~ size of a Malev74 is the same 
approximate size as an United States Army Brigade (approximately 2000 personnel) and 
Estonian Defense force structure indicated that there are fIfteen Malevs,75 that means the 
74 Ibid. 
75 Kaitseliit, 1997, Estonian Defense League "Pamphlet". T;p1inn Estonia: 
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total manpower (including other organizations within the Malev) would be approximately 
0.023 percent of the population. 
The overall results of an analysis of NDL are as follows: 
- The Estonian NDL does not achieve the standard of a structure that is 
consistent with other equivalent military organizations of that country's 
military force structure. The ability of like units to be deployed by senior 
officers and staffs, is critical, and tables of organization and equipment should 
match. 
- The structure must be capable of accomplishing an assigned war-fighting 
mission. Although, there is a combat organization within the NDL its overall 
structure is designed as a social organization. This aspect can not be 
effectively evaluated without further extensive study, remaining a subject in 
question. 
- Clearly defined organizational structure. The current structure of the Malev 
shows the capability of effective, well defined organization. 
- The organizations must be obtainable, realistic and achie.vable. Units need to 
be structured and located in geographically supportive communities. This 
should be based on population and means of transportation. "The strength of 
- these groups [NDL] differs from 80 men in smaller towns to 200 men in 
towns like Parnu.,,76 This is demographic issue is inherent with any Reserve 
structured organization. The units that are located in populated areas and have 
76 Stefan, Marx Jane's Intelligence Review, EUROPE. (Jane's February 1994) 53. 
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a large pool of members to draw from appear to be doing quite well. 
Conversely, those that are located in geographically unsupportable areas 
suffer from lack of an adequate recruiting pool. This means that units will 
have to conform to geographical population shifts. This is evident within the 
Pamu area where the original company has been expanded to a battalion. This 












Territorial Defense Units 
Figure 5. Organization of Estonian National Defense League Malev 
While still in its embryonic stage of development, the NDL has shown great 
promise in the area of the organization of small units (squads, teams etc.). Its 
squads and teams have shown great capability during several competitions 
within the Estonian Defense force games. The NDL also hosts these games 
and rewards units for outstanding performance in soldier skills. 
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2. Equipping 
Currently, the NDL is armed with ex-Soviet light arms, and privately owned 
weapons. Soviet weapon maintenance is rudimentarily simple and the systems are quite 
dependable under adverse conditions. Although reliable, this mixture of private and ex-
Soviet equipment will cause eventual logistical concerns in the future, because of the 
diverse calibers and inconsistency of integrated weapons throughout the organization. 
Based on my conversation with LTC Tammelia, I understand that the United States is 
providing Estonia with a large shipment of M-14 rifles. This weapon is an outstanding 
field rifle and has a proven combat record in Vietnam. This rifle will provide the needed 
firepower to the infantry squads. If provided to the EDF and NDL units, the only 
ammunition the Estonian military would have to procure would be NATO 7.62mm, 
which can be obtainea in most regional countries. Since '·'Estonia's goal'is to develop its 
own military industrial complex,m the ability to produce one standard caliber of 
ammunition is critical. Selection of a standard caliber could afford logistics planners the 
ability to simplify the focus of the military industry. 
Within the limits of Estonia's tiny defense budget, the available equipment that is 
relevant to the orgaitization's task. For the infantry units, small arms weapons are 
available however, these units are lacking when it comes to the anti-tank and indirect fire 
mode. Since a major threat to Estonia's security is the instability in Russia, any act of 
aggression will manifest itself in the use of a Motorized Rifle Regiment (or greater). 
Therefore a heavy emphasis on anti-tank weaponry is needed within infantry units. 
78 
Estonian leaders understand this and have been addressing this problem. Their efforts 
have resulted in accession of recoilless rifles and 105mm howitzers from foreign 
contributors. However, the need for larger amounts of anti-tank weapons integrated 
within the combat units is still a concern. 
Maintenance time to keep the equipment operational should be kept at a 
minimum, to maximize valuable training time. Estonia can achieve this, since there are 
few, if any, high tech, maintenance intensive weapons in their inventory. The only 
systems that are considered high tech are found in the communications units. These are 
part of the active duty component, whose personnel have the time to train and maintain 
the equipment. Ex-Soviet equipment and weapons are designed for ease of care, and 
maintenance, and have been the main weapon of the NDL. With the advent of the M-14, 
. routine maintenance will continue to be at the soldier level. . 
The technical qualities of the equipment should not· be time intensive, thereby 
reducing training time. Estonia can achieve this standard, since all assigned equipment is 
rudimentarily simple to operate. 
3. Training the Force 
The NDL is currently suffering from the same problems as its active duty 
counterpart, in that it lacks standardized training. Unit commanders do have training 
standards, in accordance with LTC Tarnmillia comments, but are also free to train in an 
unstructured manner on tasks to their particular liking. While many commanders have 
n Guderjohn, Larry W. COL, MLT Estonia Team Chief (EUCOM). Interviewed by author, 20 April 1998, 
e-mail, Tallinn Estonia, and in person 23 Sept 1998. 
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Soviet military experience, within recent years many have been trained in Finland, United 
States, Sweden, and other countries. Consequently, fundamental battle tasks are not 
standardized. A squad in one Malev may not be training to the same standard (or for that 
matter to the same task) as a corresponding squad in another Malev. This is a problem 
plaguing the Active component as well, and is currently under analysis by the General 
Staff. Until a resolution of standardized training within all Estonian forces is 
implemented, training will be disorganized and unable to achieve higher collective tasks 
above company (150 - man organization) level, and organized tactical maneuvers will be 
difficult. Although the Kaitseliit [NDL] has a long heritage of marksmanship training,18 
and has achieved high results, the maneuvering of forces above squad level will require 
identified tasks. Until Estonians establish a universal training standard for maneuver 
tasks, this type of training is unachievable. 
78 Ibid. 
The overall results of Estonian Training levels are as follows: 
Standardized training that is universally used within the nation's defense 
structure needs to be finalized and instituted in all units. 
Available training time needs to be maximized to accomplish war-fighting 
tasks. 
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The war-fighting tasks need to be identified and placed into two categories: 
- Sustainment: These tasks to be accomplished during peacetime 
- Mobilization: Tasks that are not trained on during peace time, but must be 
achieved prior to deployment into combat operations 
This two-tiered level of training cannot be achieved until training standards have 
been identified and separated as indicated above. Since Estonia would require rapid 
mobilization (short in duration) sustainment training would have to address most of the 
tasks needed for combat operations. This would therefore set the standard for the amount 
of training time needed by Estonian reserve forces to maintain high levels of readiness. 
4. Leadership Dimension 
Leadership, in the minds of most military experts is the most critical dynamic of 
any military organization. Leadership is the basis on which all other fundamentals are 
built. Without a command structure, which provides the· direction and goals of an 
organization, anarchy prevails. In Estonia's case, this area is in transition, as would be 
expected. The current "higher military officers are Estonian loyal, Soviet trained 
officers,,79. The current tone of leadership is Soviet style, but with an open mind to the 
future. Aspects of Western leadership principles are under consideration for adaptation 
to the Estonian leadership-training model. The current focus of attention, at the General 
Staff and Ministry of Defense levels, is the establishment of a standardized officer 
qualification system. Factions within the military infrastructure want an academic 
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military academy, which provides the officer candidates with civilian education, and 
military technical skills. Others want a grass roots officer's training course (similar to an 
American Officer Candidate School program) that just teaches leadership and military 
techniques for qualification of junior officers. Agreement has been realized on having a 
professional officer-training course focused heavily on the professional and tactical 
aspects of leaders. The senior leadership is "primarily focused on training future leaders 
to met the challenges of national Estonian defense security"SO in the coming years. By 
focusing on officer training, other fundamental concerns within the Estonian military 
community can be resolved in time. Currently, Estonian senior level military leadership 
has expertise in Soviet training and several officers have experience in Afghanistan. This 
knowledge and experience will be directed towards a more Western style principle of 
leadership as the responsibility of officership . is curre~tly under revision. The senior 
leadership has been rocked by several scandals including as an illegal weapons exchange 
with shades of black-market deals. This has caused the resignation of key figures 
including the Defense Force Commander Einseln (a former United States Army Colonel) 
who is currently facing charges of "harming the states' !nterests for having granted the 
permission for the import of guns. ,,81 Therefore, the responsibility of the Estonian 
leadership has been under scrutiny and the current commander (General Johannes Kert) is 
79 Toom, Aivar 2LT, Estonian Defense Force (General Staff). Interviewed by author, 24 May 1998, in 
Eerson, Monterey, California. 
o Guderjohn, Larry W. COL, MLT Estonia Team Chief (EUCOM). Interviewed by author, 20 April 1998, 
e-mail, Tallinn Estonia. 
81 Defense Review. Unknown Copyright. [22 April 1998]. No. 16-98. 
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pressing for reforms. The corporate aspects of the organization would be impacted by the 
type of leadership training and living conditions that will be developed in the coming 
years. The characteristic of military leadership in Estonia can be assessed as follows: 
- The expertise of officers hip within Estonia can only be considered under 
transition at this time. The on Western style leadership will result in initial 
changes at the middle management level. 
The responsibility of officership within the Estonian military is in crisis, since 
leadership is the target of several scandals. The focus on Western style 
leadership may also prevent further problems. This can also be considered a 
societal norm which through effective leadership training and the proper 
focus, can be directed in the way the Estonian senior leadership desires. 
The corporate character of officers within the Estonian military is evolving. 
As the older Soviet style "combat commanders" move out of the system and 
are replaced with progressive, western style leaders, comradeship and national 
focus will prevail. 
Estonian reserve forces show signs of, and great potential for, professionalism. 
Their nationalistic spirit and determination provide the base for a reserve structure that 
can be professional, competent, and a combat force to contend with. However the 
identified deficiencies could deter the Estonian NDL from effectively achieving its desire 
to become a professional reserve component. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. ESTONIA'S FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS 
As indicated in this research, it is apparent that Estonia is making great strides 
towards becoming a consolidated democratic nation. As Estonia moves forward, its 
sovereignty will be in question if it can not sustain its national security It is clear from 
history and current world events that Russia is ultimately the largest threat to Estonian 
sovereignty. Although the Estonian active duty forces would put up a valiant effort, its 
numbers, equipment, and various levels of training would be no match against Russian 
might. There is no doubt that a divisional size organization, in conjunction with airborne, 
and airmobile forces could effectively occupy Estonia within a few days. However, the 
true fight will be the Estonian people because of their nationalism and commitment to the 
Estonian state. Its committed population would 'continue to provide resistance while 
political efforts would spearhead international support within the world community to 
reestablish Estonia as an independent state. 
Therefore, I believe that Estonia should look very hard at how it can quickly and 
effectively mobilize the population to counter a threat to national security. Estonian's 
military, political, and cultural might lays firmly with the population. By capitalizing on 
the strengths (as well at the weakness) of a reserve component structure, Estonia can 
achieve several benefits to social capital and as well as a major asset to the national 
defense posture. 
The fITst of such issues is basing the national defense organization on the grass 
roots of society. The Estonian community can readily identify with such an organization, 
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since families and other people join up. This approach has a tendency of producing 
community involvement, and social capital. When identity is established with the 
Estonian military, public support and commitment will become second nature. Currently 
most Estonians understand the need for a military, but their understanding is based on the 
former Soviet Red Army as the strong arm of an oppressive regime. Placing the bulk of 
the Estonian military defense at the grass roots level will result in identification with the 
Estonian society, thereby improving the civil military relationships with the community. 
A reserve component or citizen-soldier concept is non-threatening on the 
international level, since by its nature the citizen occupies his/her profession during the 
day, and dons the uniform for the defense of the nation in times of need. This inherent 
aspect of the citizen-soldier concept provides a clear signal to international actors. 
Estonia is committed to the survival of its sovereignty, and it is not interested in 
expansion or is a threat to the sovereignty of other regional nations. 
A reserve structure by its nature is cost effective. It costs less to sustain a 
reservist as compared to an active duty soldier, since there is no need to house the soldier 
and provide for other soldier welfare requirements. Even w1}en a reservist is paid, there 
are more cost savings as compared to his active duty counterpart. By carefully 
determining the number of days of training needed to maintain a desired level of 
proficiency, the total amount of man dollars (kroons) expended would be considerably 
less than the amount required to pay for a active duty soldier. Along with reduced costs 
there are residual benefits. Government money would be placed directly into the 
community in a way that is proportional to the demographics of the reserve units. The 
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incentive to serve ,and be paid will cause for an increase in numbers, and may be 
considered a reward for service to the Estonian State. 
Additionally reduced costs can be realized in the sustainment of equipment, and 
materials. Since a reserve component does not utilize its equipment and materials on a 
daily basis, the equipment will not sustain large amounts of fair wear and tear, and will 
therefore maintain a longer service life. Substantial cost savings can be realized in the 
reduced amount of usage. All in all, when constructed in an efficient manner, a reserve 
component can provide a military force that is cost effective. This is desirable for any 
small defense budget. 
Estonia is currently maintaining its active forces through a one-year conscription 
program. This system can be modified to provide manpower sources for a reserve 
component. A conscript who has completed his one-year commitment is a trained asset 
that is lost to the Estonian military infrastructure. Therefore, a policy of "pay to stay" 
should be considered. This, along with training soldiers for civilian endeavors could 
produce extended value to trained soldiers. Through the creation of laws, a conscript can 
extend his service for a number of years in the reserve forces. This ~lows for the money 
used to train the conscript to be extended longer, therefore creating a for cost effective 
means of maintaining an efficient national defense posture. 
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The large number of Russian ethnic people in Estonia may constitute a potential 
threat to Estonian national security through the formation of a "fifth column" movement. 
The Estonian Defense establishment can ill afford to ignore this potential threat.. The 
best way to identify a potential "fifth column" operation is at the grass roots level. 
A practical aspect of a reserve organization is that it can actively defend the 
nation at its lOwest level. Through community involvement, people see the development 
and can convey this information to the appropriate authorities, which in this case could be 
the NDL. What better way to identify and counteract a grass roots fifth column effort, 
than by the establishment and maintenance of a reserve component organization closely 
tied to the community? Therefore, the need to identify any fifth column organization is 
something that needs to be considered, and can best be done by a decentralized NDL. 
Reserve organizations by their nature and demographics, are decentralized 
organizations. A reserve organization is capable of going "underground" and operating 
autonomously. Thus a decentralized reserve would provide Estonia with an organization 
that is capable of operating directly with a command structure, but can still be proficient 
when the command relationship is severed. This duality would pose an interesting threat 
to an external aggressor. 
A reserve force is uniquely qualified to provide support to the civil authority at 
the grass roots level. This is usually evident in the United States through support to state 
and local agencies during natural disaster, or civil disobedience. Reserve forces can be 
put into service to support the civil authority with equipment and manpower. This 
additional asset to the civilian authority is yet another benefit to a reserve component. 
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With Estonia located on the Baltic the weather conditions are very cold and snowy. In 
extreme conditions, reserve units can be called upon to assist with natural disasters much 
like the American National Guard. This ability to depend on a community based force 
during times of emergency and civil disobedience allows the local government more 
assets and resources to solve problems at the lowest level. "This availability has already 
been demonstrated within the NDL during rescue operations involving a school bus 
accident outside of Tartu. NDL units provided the needed manpower to assist local 
agencies to gather up children injured in a school bus accident. ,,82 
With these social conditions in their various stages of development, it is safe to 
say that the conditions are ripe for Estonia to embrace the citizen-soldier concept. 
However, there are critical decisions that have to be made to capitalize on the benefits of 
the reserve organization indicated. The first consideration is to determine the type of· . 
reserve component organization desired, since there are several courses of actions 
available to the Estonian Defense establishment. There are many Western models 
evaluate and to emulate. Regardless of the system the Estonians select, it has to be 
adapted to the Estonian condition. As revealed in this research, Estonia currently has two 
reserve component structures, the ND.L and a centralized reserve formation. The reserve 
system has seen its first test at mobilization within the last six months, and shows 
promise. The NDL has made great strides but lacks the resources and standardization 
required to fight above the company level. I would contend that Estonia, needs to adopt 
82 Guderjohn, Larry W. COL, MLT Estonia Team Chief (EUCOM). Interviewed by author, 20 April 1998, 
e-mail, Tallinn Estonia, and in person 23 Sept 1998. 
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one reserve system and begin to funnel resources in that direction. With Estonia's current 
inadequate defense budget, it is imperative that critical assets are not wasted on two 
different reserve components. Therefore, I believe that Estonia should look very hard at 
how it can quickly and effectively mobilize the population to counter a threat to national 
security. 
B. PROFESSIONALIZING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE LEAGUE 
(KAITSELIIT) 
The NDL is my 'personal choice for a reserve force based on several empirical 
factors. First, it can easily be decentralized. This will improve its survivability during a 
major military invasion. The NDL can easily be capitalized upon, being already 
established and rooted in the local community. Additionally, the NDL contains within its 
organization other groups that can provide social capital. This is e~actly the type of 
benefit that a young energetic democracy needs. Finally the NDL has a tradition of 
service to the Estonian State, and promotes the patriotic spirit that has been damaged 
during the occupation. 
The following areas should be considered to improve the NDL, and make it more 
professional: 
- There are many existing reserve component models (e.g. Switzerland, United 
States, England, Sweden, Finland) to evaluate' for the purposes of their 
adaptability to the Estonian culture. No one model should be copied entirely, 
but an evaluation of those systems that aFe successful should be done. A 
unique Estonian reserve component model can be developed for the NDL. 
The Swiss model has a uniquely European quality, while the United States 
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National Guard model shows the ability to decentralize. Comparing and 
contrasting other reserve systems can isolate the positive aspects of each 
which can be applied to the NDL. 
- No matter what system is selected, there will be the need to support it. If little 
or no resources are placed into a reserve, it will fail during time of need. The 
monetary savings of a reserve are self evident: pay is based on time served 
(which is less than the active soldier), there is no need to billet troops since 
they reside at home, and equipment maintains a long service life because it is 
not used and abused. The cost involved must be realized and built into the 
defense budget for Estonia to utilize effectively any reserve system. By 
focusing on the NDL there aresidual benefit is obtained. The money placeq in 
this organization will also find its way into the communities and will also help 
stimulate the social capital provided by this organization provides. 
- Integration with Active Forces. During the course of this research I 
discovered that the Active duty units are spending time with their respective 
local NDL units. Training is being conducted, ~d relationships are being 
established. This integration needs to be expanded to the point where the 
active forces and NDL conduct training operations together, and become more 
effectively integrated. The early stages of this process have begun, and it is 
critical that the process be allowed to continue and expand. I would 
recommend that the NDL combat organizations not exceed one battalion size 
organization within each Malev. This will allow interaction with active forces 
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at a lower level. By starting at the individual level and progressively moving 
up to conducting unit and staff operations, this integration can be achieved. 
NDL squads should work closely with their active duty contemporaries for a 
period of about two years. Once this has been accomplished the next step 
would be to do the same at the platoon level. By conducting operations with 
the active component the NDL will gain confidence, create a harmonious 
working relationship, lower the active / reserve barrier, keep up on 
contemporary changes in doctrine and increase its level of readiness. This 
interrelationship will provide the start point of a total force concept and create 
a more harmonious atmosphere between the active component and the NDL. 
Organization: War fighters are not social groups. There needs to be a 
separation of the war fighting units and the social groups in the NDL. This 
will insure that during operations there is no confusion as to the duties and 
responsibilities, so that the organization is able to function efficiency. This 
will take away the vale of the "Good Old Boy" club, and allow it to function 
as a combat unit. It is critical to have such a interrelationship with the social 
organizations, as long as it does not interfere with readiness, or combat 
operations. The unit should be easily accessible, capable of divorcing itself 
from social responsibilities, and maintaining combat standards. In order to 
reduce this issue it is necessary to establish and enforce individual readiness 
standards. As these individual standards are applied, two things will occur: 1) 
all soldiers will understand their necessity, since the standards should be based 
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on combat survivability (tasks like shooting, physical fitness, education, etc.) 
and 2) those who do not met the standards will either rise to the standards or 
move on. In the example of the NDL they can continue their service within 
the social organization, thereby providing support to the war-fighters. 
Estonia's unique example can provide a win-win situation for anyone wishing 
to provide service to the nation. 
- Combat unit sizes and force structure: Estonian demographics will dictate the 
size and structure of units. These units need to contain the same elements as 
their respective aC,tive duty counterparts. In this way command elements will 
know how to deploy these units in times of conflict. It is also important ,to 
consider the demographic factor, and not follow the mistake of the United 
States National Guard which placed units where the population density is not 
conducive to support large units. 
- Leadership training: Although very diffi'cult for the EDL, the officer training 
should be the same as the active duty officer. There may be some 
modification due to training time, but the s,tandards should be exactly the 
same. This will be a difficult venture, since training time will be at a 
premium. However, the end result will be a homogenized leadership corps 
that has shared experiences and understanding. This will produce mutual 
respect between the active serve and the NDL, and therefore lower the degree 
of separation between the two components. A residual effect will be that 
leadership skills and principles provided to the members of the NDL will 
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uniquely ,find their way into the Estonian private sector. These leadership 
principles are universal and can be used in business and other social 
undertakings. The question remains whether the leadership training should be 
built from the bottom-up or top-down. At this time I feel that Soviet 
leadership still heavily influences the leadership and training styles, so I 
would recommend a bottom-up approach. This will allow the steady, yet 
consistent change of leadership philosophy to migrate within the leadership 
corps. There may also be a concerted effort on the senior leadership to look at 
foreign examples to insure that the direction is in accordance with Estonian 
wishes. This will allow Estonia to mirror leadership training to fit their 
particular need, which is decentralized leadership with a focus on individual 
and leader initiative. Therefore I would recommend that the Estonians adopt 
the fundamentals of American Military Leadership principles contained within 
FM 22-100 (Leadership). 
- Equipment: This will be extremely difficult for the defense establishment to 
achieve due to their limited budget. The only effective. recourse is a long-
range strategy of procurement, which will provide for standardized equipment 
and ordinance for the active serve and the NDL. Ammunition and weapon 
systems can be standardized between the two components for the purpose of 
interoperability. 
- Standardized training: Once a set of training requirements and standards is 
established by the Estonian defense authorities for individual and collective 
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tasks, the units can be trained to a desired readiness level. These standards 
should be universal within the Estonian military for both the active and 
reserve components. For the reserve component these standards would b~ 
broken down between sustainment and mobilization training tasks. The 
reserve component should focus primarily on individual tasks and those 
collective tasks that would be needed to mobilize quickly. This is based on 
the threat level Estonia should anticipate within its strategic planning process. 
The threat level will also provide for the ability to utilize the NDL for other 
than military operations. The NDL can be mobilized to provide needed 
manpower for natural disasters and civil disturbances. Therefore at any given 
time, the NDL can be mobilized and the training tailored to the purpose of the 
mobilization. Although trained for combat· operations, when mobilized, the 
NDL can use the mobilization training time to prepare for emergency 
response and not just for combat operations. 
Pay and allowances: Estonian reserve soldiers should be paid. There are 
currently great morale problems in this area and they should be addressed 
within the Estonian defense establishment. Some type of pay should be 
considered for the reserve component. This would provide an extra incentive 
for soldiers to be available for training. The Estonian defense establishment 
should also consider other types of incentives to include limited medical 
benefits, insurance, and possibility of college credits for equivalent military 
training. This provides incentives to the community to become involved with 
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military service and the additional education will create more highly educated 
community. 
- Legislative support: Soldier and employers rights should be legislated to 
protect both the citizen-soldiers and their respective employers. Since 
military training could inteIfere with a soldier's civilian profession, legal 
statutes should establish rights for both the soldier and the employer. The law 
needs protect the community, the private sector and the individual. 
By focusing on the areas that I have indicated, I feel the Estonian Defense 
establishment can achieve a viable reserve establishment within the NDL that is cost 
effective and can provide for the defense of Estonia. Given Estonia's current situation 
and limitations this option appears to be the only one that makes sense and provides 
residual social benefits that can enhance Estonian society. This win-win situation can 
enable Estonia to create a strong defense, wq.ich will deter any external threat and p~ovide 
a rallying point for the Estonian society in furthering their patriotic values. 
When looking at the two existing organizations, the reserve system appears to be 
centralized, while the NDL, which is located in the fifteep. districts, is decentralized. The 
Estonian defense establishment needs to identify the type of organization it wants. As 
indicated, the budget can ill afford the active component much less the addition of 
structures for a centralized reserve. By improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
NDL the Estonian Defense establishment can build upon an existing reserve system and 
gain residual benefit from the social capital developed in the NDL. Therefore, I would 
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conclude that there is a lot of benefit in professionlizing the NDL, and that Estonia should 
decide against a centralized reserve system. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Estonia has shown great promise as a nation state. By moving quickly to 
consolidate democracy, Estonia has shown its potential to become a progressive and 
democratic society. These principles can only thrive if Estonia has the military forces 
necessary to maintain its sovereignty as a nation state. 
Military force structure decisions must reflect the nature of the external threat to a 
country's sovereignty. When the threat levels are high standing armies are necessary. 
For instance, the volatile security in the Balkan region forces even an economically 
deprived nation like Croatia to devote large amounts of their budget to sustain a standing 
army. The corollary is that ~hen threat levels are low, standing armies are less 
necessary, and can pose a threat to domestic stability. In the case of Estonia, where the 
threat level is low, a standing army is less appropriate to rely on than reserve forces. 
Estonia also requires a system of defense that emulates the principles of its 
democratic society. The best way to provide a progressive civilian-military relationship 
within the democratic environment is to link the army with the people. The way to 
maintain a military structure, without posing a threat to the established democratic 
government, is to have a military formed by the people, who themselves are the 
government. 
By developing a framework to assess a professional reserve component, and by 
using it to evaluate the Estonian NDL, I have shown that the Estonian Defense 
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establishment needs to make some long term organizational decisions regarding the 
citizen.:soldier concept. First, Estonia should focus its attention on only one reserve 
component organization, either a centralized reserve system or the, NDL. Second, I 
would contend that Estonia should build on the existing structure of the NDL, which 
provides more benefits than the man-power pool of a centralized reserve. Third, the 
Estonian Defense establishment should consider professionalizing the NDL utilizing 
most if not all of the variables that I have provided in this thesis. The desired 
consequence of that decision would be a NDL that will provide the Estonian Defense 
establishment with a reserve force capable of being professional and contributing to the 
national defense. 
This progressive and innovative idea of the citizen-soldier is hardly new, and we 
, have seen many examples around the world that prove it 'can work. Its ability to work 
will depend on the Estonian people. The recommendations that I have presented reflect 
an outsider's understanding of the social conditions, and military professionalism in 
Estonia. Ultimately, however it will be the Estonian application that makes the citizen-
soldier concept a reality for Estonia. I have determined, th~ough this analysis, that the 
component parts exist, and they need to be nurtured over time to achieve the desired end 
state of a democratic nation supported by a civilian based military, capable of making an 
external aggressor think twice before initiating military action. This is the desired 





"Estonia: Officials Discuss Costs of Joining European Union" Estonia Tallinn Radio 
Network in Estonian (11 September 1996) Translation by the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service, FBIS Daily Report - Baltic States (FBIS-SOV -96-178). 
"Estonia: Prime Minister Comments on NATO Membership. "Estonia Moscow 
INTERFAX (12 September 1996) Translation by the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service, FBIS Daily Report - Baltic States (FBIS-SOV-96-178). 
"Estonia: MP Queries Citizenship Law Mter Latvia, Lithuania Complain. "Estonia 
Tallinn Radio Network . (10 September 1996) Translation by the Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service, FBIS Daily Report - Baltic States (FBIS-SOV -96-
177). 
"Kallas Seeks Clarification of U.S. Statement on NATO Entry. "Tallinn Estonia, Tallinn 
Estonian Television Network (29 September 1996). Translation by the Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Baltic States; 4 March 1998 
(FBIS-SOV-96-192). 
"Meri 'Disappointed' With German Views on NATO Expansion." Tallinn Estonia, 
Tallinn ETA (1 October 1998). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service, FBIS Daily Report - Baltic States: 4 March 1998 (FBIS-SOW-96-192). 
INTERNET 
About Janes. 30 January 1997. Available [Online]: <http://www.J~es.comL> [19 April 
1998]. 
About NATO. Unknown Copyright. Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int> [19 April 
1998]. 
About U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Unknown Copyright Available 
[Online]: <http://www.acda.gov/ > [19 April 1998]. 
Baltic News Service. Copyright 1995. Available [Online]: <http://www.bns.ee/> 
[19 April 1998]. 
Defense Link. Unknown Copyright. Available [Online]: 
<http://www.defenselink.millpubs/indes.html > [19 April 1998]. 
99 
Defense Review. Unknown Copyright. Available [Online]: <tammela@www.estemb.org> 
[22 April 1998]. . 
Embassy of Estonia in Washington, D. C. Copyright 1997 . Available [ Online] 
<http://www.estemb.org! > [20 April 1998]. 
Estonian World Wide Web. Copyright Unknown. Available [Online] 
<http://www.ee/www/Culture_and Society/welcome.html > [26 October 1998] 
Estonian Higher Educational Institutions. Copyright Unknown, Available [Online] 
<http://www.stat.ee/wwwstatfcontentfCS_SL_UKl1.html> [20 October 1998] 
Joint Contact Team Program. 21 April 1998. Available [Online] 
<http://www.eucom.millprograms/jctp/> [22 April 1998]. 
Office of the President Estonian Republic. Copyright 1996. Available [Online] 
<http://www.president.ee/> [20 April 1998]. 
Office of the Prime Minister. 18 March 1997. Available [Online] 
<http://www.rk.ee/pm/> [20 April 1998]. 
Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Copyright 1998. Available [OQline] 
<http://www.vm.ee> [22 ApriI1998]. 
Open Estonia Foundation. Copyright 1997. Available [Online] 
<http://www.oef.org.ee > [20 April 1998]. 
The RAND Corporation. Unknown Copyright. Available [Online]: 
<http://www.rand.orgf> [19 April 1998]. 
BOOKS 
Anatol, Lieven. The Baltic Revolution Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to 
Independence. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1993. 
Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 1996-1997, Washington / London, 
Brassey's, 1996. 
Crackel, Theodore J. Mr. Jefferson's Army - Political and Social Reform of the Military 
Establishment, 1801--1809, New York and London, New York University Press, 
1987. 
100 
Diamond Larry and Plattner Marc F. "Civil-Military Relations and Democracy" 
Baltimore and London, The John Hopkins Press 1996. 
Graham, Malbone Watson. New Governments of Eastern Europe: Estonia - Politics and 
Government. New York: H. Holt and Company [c1927]. 
Grimmett, Richard F. Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations 1988-1995. 
Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1996. 
Hart, Gary The Minuteman, Restoring an Army of the People, New York, The Free Press 
1998. 
Huntington Samuel P., "The Soldier and the State" Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press 
of Harvard 1957. 
Krepp, Endel. The Estonian War of Independence, 1918-1920: On the Occasion of its 
6dh Anniversary from the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the Treaty of Peace at Tartu. 
Stockholm: Estonian Information Centre, 1980. 
Laar, Mart. War in the Woods: Estonia's Struggle for Survival, 1944-1956. Washington 
D.C.: Compass Press; 1992. 
RAND Corp. "Postmobilization Training Resource Requirement.s." RAND Corp. 
Publishing Arroyo Center 1996. 
Raun, Toivo U. Estonia and the Estonians. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford 
. University, 1991. 
Snider, Don M. and Carlton-Carew, Maranda A. U.S. Civil-Military Relations, 
Washington D.C., The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995. 
Stefan, Marx Jane's Intelligence Review, EUROPE. Jane's February 1994. 
Taagepera, Rein. Eslonia: Return to Independence. Bolder: Westview Press, 1993. 
Western, J.R. The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century, Great Britain, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd. 1965. 
PAMPHLETSIMANUSCRIPTS 
Kititseliit, 1997, Estonian Defense League "Pamphlet" .'Tallinn Estonia: Author. 
Harold A. Trinkunas, "CRAFTING CIVIliAN CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES: 
STATECRAFT, INSTITUTIONS, AND MILITARY SUBORDINATION IN 
101 
EMERGING DEMOCRACIES". Dissertation Manuscript, Department of Political 
Science, Stanford University, Forthcoming August 1997. 
INTERVIEWS 
Guderjohn, Larry W. COL, MLT Estonia Team Chief (EUCOM). In~erviewed by author, 
20 April 1998, e-mail, Tallinn Estonia, and in person 23 Sept 1998. 
MOlder, Rolger Estonian Ministry of Defense. Interviewed by author, 28 November 
1998, in person, Monterey, California 
Tammela, Tiit LTC Estonian Military Attache to the United States. Interviewed by 
author, 22 Sept. 1998, in person Washin,gton D.C .. 
Toom, Aivar 2LT, Estonian Defense Force (General Staff). Interviewed by author, 24 
May 1998, in person, Monterey, California. 
102 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center ................................................................ 2 
8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944 
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218 
2. Dudley Knox Library ........................................................................................... 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
411 Dyer Rd. 
Monterey, CA 93943-5101 
3. LTG James F. Freherd ......................................................................................... 1 
Adjutant General for the State of Maryland 
Fifth Regiment Armory 
Baltimore, MD 21201-2288 
4. BG H. Stephen Blum ............................................................................................. 1 
Assistant Adjutant General (Army) for the State of Maryland 
Fifth Regiment Armory 
Baltimore, MD 21201-2288 
5. BG Bruce Tuxil .................................................................................................... 1 
Assistant Adjutant General (Air) for the State of Maryland 
Fifth Regiment Armory 
. Baltimore, MD 21201-2288 
6. COL Edwin Livingston ........................................................................................ 1 
NGB-ARZ-RM 
Jefferson Plaza 1, 11 th Floor 
1411 Jefferson Davis Highway 
Arlington, VA 22202-3231 
7. COL Warner Sumpter .......................................................................................... 1 
Chief of Staff Maryland Army National Guard 
Fifth Regiment Armory 
Baltimore, MD 21201-2288 
8. COL (Ret) Larry W. Guderjohn ........................................................................... 1 
3 Paula Place Apt #3-D 
Baltimore, MD 21237 
103 
9. COL Grant L. Hayden ........................................................................................... 1 
Military Liaison Team 
Republic of Estonia 
C/O Military Support to Civilian Affairs 
Fifth Regiment Armory 
Baltimore, MD 21201-2288 
10. LTC Richard Schnell ............................................................................................ 1 
Director Military Support to Civilian Affairs 
Fifth Regiment Armory 
Baltimore, MD 21201-2288 
11. MAl William R. Everett ....................................................................................... 3 
Operations Military Support to Civilian Affairs 
Fifth Regiment Armory 
Baltimore, MD 21201-2288 
104 
